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This thesis is examines the imperial attachment to the Suez Canal from 1875 to 
1956. It begins with the canal share purchase by the Disraeli Government and ends with 
the Suez Crisis. Traditional scholarship views relations between the Britain and the Suez 
Canal as disjointed and highlighted by sporadic significant events. This thesis aims to 
evaluate the history of these relations. The thesis is divided into five chapters with the 
imperial attachment to the canal is divided into three chronological periods. In each phase 
of attachment there is at least one distinct policy shift and re-evaluation of the importance 
of the Suez Canal. While canal importance fluctuated, the continued re-strengthening of 
the attachment demonstrates a continuous attachment to the canal. These findings 
disprove traditional view of Anglo-Suez relations being disjointed. Summarily, this thesis 
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 On April 25, 1859, Ferdinand de Lesseps struck the ceremonial first blow at what 
would become the Suez Canal at the town later to be known as Port Said.1 Upon 
completion, the canal stretched one hundred miles. It connected the Red Sea with the 
Mediterranean and opened on November 17, 1869.  The Suez Canal cut the travel time 
between Europe and the Far East and served to invigorate the Indian trade even further; 
however, an unintended problem with the canal arose.  The canal belonged to Egypt, but 
also belonged to mankind.2  Historian Hugh Schonfield believed the canal had two 
owners: Egypt and the rest of the world.  The universal use of the canal caused it to 
become an international concern and gave impetus for European powers to involve 
themselves in Egyptian affairs.  The canal not only represented a great development in 
trade and technology, but also generated a new point of disputation among the powers of 
Europe.  The party most interested in the canal was Britain, despite having opposed the 
canal construction and taken steps to obstruct the completion of the project.  To the 
British, the canal was of dire importance as the gateway to India.  The canal would earn 
titles such as nodal point, jugular vein of empire, and Clapham junction, a one hundred 
                                                 
1 Hugh Schonfield, The Suez Canal in Peace and War 1869-1969 (Coral Gables, FL.: University of Miami 
Press, 1969), 37. 
2 Ibid., x. 
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mile waterway on which the survival of the British Empire rested and which was the 
main fulcrum of continued British control over India.  The British were intimately 
associated with the canal from the inception of the project to the aftermath of the 
nationalization of the canal in late 1956.  The history of British involvement in the Suez 
Canal from 1875 to 1956 demonstrates a multitude of attitudes towards the canal and a 
constant British willingness to defend the canal as if it were part of the Home Islands.  In 
reference to the canal, the term British refers to the military and political leaders of 
Britain.  While the common populace of Britain possessed a certain affinity for the canal, 
the officials of the British government formulated and affected policy towards the Suez 
Canal. 
 The British involvement with the Suez Canal existed long before its construction. 
The importance of Egypt was most vividly illustrated by the French invasion of Egypt in 
1798.  Prior to 1800, the British had expected any challenge to India and the Middle East 
to come from the sea and concentrated their defense efforts on a strong navy to aid in the 
protection of both India and the road to India.  The situation changed when a French 
force under Napoleon invaded and occupied Egypt in 1798.  The French invasion forced 
Britain to deal with the vulnerability of the crossroads of the world, from which her 
Indian trade and Eastern Empire could be menaced.  A foreign power controlling the 
overland route to India could harass British trade in the Middle East, prevent British 
supply ships from taking on food and supplies in the region, and presumably march on 
the frontier of India.  In 1800, the British took the momentous decision to send an 
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expeditionary force to aid the Ottomans in repelling the French and to evict them from 
Egypt.  According to historian Edward Ingram, this decision demonstrated the British 
priority for colonial and imperial matters over those of the continent and showed a shift 
in British policy.3  The French invasion not only demonstrated a veritable weakness in 
the British defense of India, but also ushered in a British policy of regarding the Middle 
East, particularly Egypt, as a vital barrier for the safeguard of the Indian Empire. 
 The granting of the canal concession in 1856 and the possibility of a French canal 
controlling the route to India sent British politicians and officials into a panic.  The 
Egyptian Government granted the concession a year before the 1857 Revolt in India, 
which was put down with much effort by the British and caused a revision of their 
methods of rule in India.4  French control of the canal would result in quicker access to 
India by French troops and the denial of passage to British troops through the canal.  The 
shares of the Canal Company were owned by private French investors, but their interests 
were safeguarded by the French Government. In the event of a French invasion of India, 
British reinforcements would be sent to India via the Cape Route, which was a slower 
journey than through the canal.  Also, British power partially derived from the strength of 
the Indian Army and an attack on India would severely weaken the power of the empire.  
The multitudinous threat of a French canal cannot be emphasized enough and the 
opportunity to gain control of the canal was in the minds of British statesmen during this 
                                                 
3 Edward Ingram, The British Empire as a World Power (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 237-261. 
4 For a description of the 1857 revolt see John McLeod,  A History of India (London: Greenwood Press, 
2002) and for a seminal study on post mutiny policy in India see Sarvelli Gopal, British Policy in India 
1858-1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).  
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time.  The Egyptian Government presented the British with an opportunity in 1875 to 
purchase shares in the Suez Canal Company.  The Suez Canal Company was the 
administrative body of the canal and supervised the running of the canal.5  It obtained its 
income through dues and tolls paid by ships passing through the canal.  The canal was 
run by a board of directors and out of a possible four hundred thousand shares, 207, 600 
were allotted to French investors and 177, 642 to Egypt.6  The extravagant debts and 
financial mishaps of Khedive Ismail of Egypt drove the country to bankruptcy and Ismail 
searched for a way to regain solvency.  The answer it seemed was to sell off the Egyptian 
shares of the Suez Canal to the highest bidder.  Egypt expected bidders to come from 
France and generate a wholly French ownership of the canal.  However, the government 
of Disraeli intervened and, without parliamentary approval, purchased the canal shares on 
November 25, 1875.7  The share purchase gave Britain 176,602 shares, close to half of 
the total shares in the company.8  Disraeli viewed the canal as the “key to India,” as many 
Englishmen did, and the purchase was a self professed triumph.  According to Disraeli, 
Queen Victoria termed the purchase a great event in modern politics and Disraeli 
believed he had prevented the canal from becoming entirely French.9  Britain owned 
                                                 
5 John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (Hamden, CT.: 
Archon Books, 1965), 61-71.  
6 Schonfield, 35. 
7 Disraeli to Lady Bradford 11-25-1875 and 11-26-75 in Marquis of Zetland ed., Letters of Disraeli to Lady 
Chesterfield and Lady Bradford 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1929), 461-463.  
8 Schonfield, 47. 
9 Disraeli to Lady Bradford 11-25-1875 and 11-26-75 in Zetland, 461-463. 
 4
nearly half of the canal shares and found commonality with France in regard to the need 
for the canal to stay open and the proper administration of Egypt.  
 
*  *  *  *  * 
Still necessary is a review of the relevant literature on the topic.  There are several 
works on the Suez Canal that provide a wealth of information and propose different 
arguments on the importance of the canal.  Charles Hallberg’s The Suez Canal: Its 
History and Diplomatic Importance is a fine work that outlines the British attachment to 
the canal up to the 1930s.10  The work purports not only the accepted thesis that as long 
as India was under British control the canal would be indispensable to the British Empire, 
but also argues that the British would take any measure possible to avoid other powers 
gaining influence over the canal.  Hallberg asserts rightly that in times of trouble the 
canal itself would become a battleground as long as the British controlled India.  
Additionally, Hugh Schonfield’s The Suez Canal in Peace and War 1869-1969 provides a 
chronological history of the canal and also addresses the duality of the canal as belonging 
to both Egypt and the world.  Schonfield traces the history of the canal itself in parallel to 
the British preoccupation with the canal and the diplomatic view of the canal in both the 
twentieth century and in light of the Eastern Question.  Schonfield argues that the canal 
belonged to Egypt and the world.  According to Schonfield, this dual ownership made the 
canal an infringement on Egyptian sovereignty.  Finally, D.A. Farnie’s East and West of 
                                                 
10 Charles Hallberg, The Suez Canal: Its History and Diplomatic Importance (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1931). 
 5
the Suez 1854-1956 is an exhaustive study of the canal and focuses on every conceivable 
economic benefit of the canal to Britain.11  It also addresses the national response to the 
purchase of the canal shares by Disraeli in 1875.  Farnie argues the economic benefit of 
the canal to Britain was the reason for the attachment.  
 The works of Hallberg, Schonfield, and Farnie are useful to the study of the Suez 
Canal, but their arguments are incomplete.  Hallberg was correct in stressing the military 
importance of the canal and that in times of trouble the canal would become a battlefield. 
He is incorrect in arguing the attachment to the canal was predicated on British control of 
India.  As this paper will show, the loss of India did little to lessen the imperial 
attachment to the canal and new reasons were found to justify continued British control 
of the canal.  Hallberg’s argument suffers due to its publication date and the state of the 
empire at the time.  Farnie correctly argues the economic importance of the canal, but 
fails to include a focus on non-economic factors.  The security reasons and the 
attachment generated through British military victories are omitted.  Schonfield provides 
an interesting argument about the canal’s effect on Egyptian sovereignty, but 
miscategorizes the forces acting against Egypt.  While Schonfield suggests it was the 
world that owned the canal and worked against Egyptian sovereignty, only Britain 
undertook such actions.  With the exception of indirect French financial control in the 
late 1870s, Britain was the only country to take direct action against Egypt for the sake of 
the canal until 1956.  These arguments merit a revision.  
                                                 
11 D.A. Farnie, East and West of Suez: the Suez Canal in History 1854-1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1969). 
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Historian Steven Morewood observed that studies of the British in the 
Mediterranean have focused on either early British involvement in the region or the Suez 
Crisis.12  Morewood aimed to remedy this situation by focusing on interwar defense 
strategy in Egypt, but only added another field to the multitude of possible areas of focus 
when looking at Britain and the Suez Canal.  As Morewood observed, most studies tend 
to care about three things: the share purchase, the 1882 invasion, and the Suez Crisis.  
Recent studies of defense strategy have existed on their own from these prior three topics 
and tend to be more focused on British lack of preparation for World War II.  Additional 
studies on the Mandate system have devolved into a recounting of the struggle between 
nationalists and British imperial desire, never incorporating the parts into the whole.  
Even histories of the canal such as those by Farnie, Hallberg, and Schonfield, tend to 
provide diplomatic histories of the canal and noteworthy events, lacking a linkage or 
systemic approach.  The most common error is to assume the canal was only important 
because of India.  This idea is incorrect. Many events involving Britain and the Suez 
Canal exist from differing sources, no attempt to link them into one coherent study has 
been undertaken. 
While the works of Farnie, Schonfield, and Hallberg deal solely with the canal, 
other works dealing with particular events in British policy towards the Suez Canal were 
used in this study. On the topic of the 1882 invasion, the most detailed commentary lies 
in Robert Harrison’s dissertation Road to Suez: Gladstone and the Egyptian Crisis of 
                                                 
12 Steven Morewood, “Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire; the Suez Canal in British Defense Strategy 
1919-1941,” in War & Society Vol. 10, No.1 (May 1992), 82. 
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1882, which not only provides an excellent depiction of the events, but also disputes the 
traditional impetus for invasion and notes that the Egyptian forts and coastal batteries 
were no legitimate threat, but did provide a casus belli.13 Foreign policy commentaries on 
the invasion also proved useful.  The traditional account of the 1882 invasion and the 
argument that one driving force was the embarrassing situation of England being a 
minority shareholder in a French company can be found in Paul Knaplund’s Gladstone’s 
Foreign Policy.  A comparison of the imperial motives of Gladstone and Disraeli is a 
centerpiece of C.C. Eldridge’s England’s Mission: the Imperial Idea in the Age of 
Gladstone and Disraeli.14  Also included in this book is the contention that the Suez Canal 
held up the empire, allowed the empire to function, and that Disraeli succeeded in gaining 
the interest of Queen Victoria in the empire.  Kenneth Bourne’s The Foreign Policy of 
Victorian England 1830-1902 provides an interesting background to the year of the share 
purchase and is Palmerston centric in its composition.15  However the work does depict 
the shifting power of the British Empire in terms of eliminating Continental threats and 
only having to deal with Russia during the time of Gladstone and Disraeli. Bourne 
provides a solid treatment to the German concession in 1888 to build the Berlin to 
Baghdad Railway, which constituted a grave threat to the Indian Empire if construction 
was completed.  The railway allowed for the possible transport of Ottoman and German 
                                                 
13 Robert Harrison, Road to Suez: Gladstone and the Egyptian Crisis of 1882 (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Southern California, 1987). 
14 C.C. Eldridge, England’s Mission: the Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). 
15 Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). 
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troops to Baghdad and the border of India.  The rail provided the Ottoman Government a 
chance to attack or subvert British influence in the Gulf Dependencies.  
Additionally, two works dealing with the charges of collusion during the Suez 
Crisis were particularly useful. A multitude of books on the Suez collusion exist with 
Terrance Robertson’s Crisis: the Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy being the most 
important.16  Robertson focuses on Lester Pearson and the dealings at the United Nations 
over Suez, which ultimately resulted in the creation of the United Nations Expeditionary 
Force, the first UN peacekeeping force.  Robertson is also one of the first authors to 
accuse the British and French of collusion with Israel in the crisis and believes the Anglo-
French ultimatum was not as idealistic as Eden and Lloyd would have scholars believe. 
Donald Neff’s Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes American into the Middle East 
provides a divergent view of the crisis and depicts the Americans as bringing justice to 
the Middle East and standing against the neo-colonial action of the British and French.17  
However, this work glosses over the comments of Dulles about Nasser needing to be 
made to disgorge the canal, which was taken as tacit approval according to Eden and 
Lloyd. 
This paper suggests that a clear British attachment to the Suez Canal existed from 
1875 to 1956.  This paper differs from others in that it will begin with the 
acknowledgement that the Suez Canal was always important to Britain and when reasons 
                                                 
16 Terence Robertson, Crisis: the Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1965). 
17 Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York: Linden 
Press, 1981).  
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for importance disappeared, such as the end of the Indian Empire, the British found new 
reasons for its importance.  The rationale for this replacement is that by the twentieth 
century and especially after the World Wars, the Suez Canal had earned its place in the 
mantle of empire and was for all practical purposes British.  It was part of the empire and 
had long been described as invaluable and accepted by the British as such. The 
attachment came from two main areas: strategic/diplomatic importance and 
romanticism/imperial thought.  By focusing on important events in British history 
involving the Suez Canal, the history of the imperial attachment will be demonstrated and 
in the end, the canal will be shown to have always been important to the British Empire.  
 This paper aims to address and evaluate the imperial attachment to the Suez Canal 
from 1875 to 1956 and to outline and evaluate the shifts in British policy in regard to the 
canal.  The approach encompasses a fusion of diplomatic history, British military history, 
imperial thought, and traditional British imperial history.  The date for the beginning of 
this work centers around the purchase of the canal shares by Disraeli in 1875.  The study 
will be divided into three main periods: 1875 -1914, 1914-1945, and 1945-1956. 
Analyzed in the years in questions are both the high point of the British Empire under 
Queen Victoria and the Disraeli and Gladstone ministries, the perils of the empire during 
the period of the World Wars, and the Suez crisis, which is widely held as the death knell 
of empire.  The rationale for the division is policy based. In the first phase from 1875 to 
1914, the early British involvement will be addressed and will entail the share purchase, 
Dual Control, and the intervention of 1882.  The first phase also addresses the start of 
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British suzerainty over Egypt and the diplomatic history pertinent to early twentieth 
century diplomacy and the Mediterranean question.  The second phase addresses World 
War I and World War II, but also extends to the interwar era to showcase not only the 
shifting British policies towards European powers, but also the last great expansion of the 
empire into the Middle East.  The third phase begins with the election of the Attlee 
government in 1945 and also depicts the postwar order, the beginnings of the Cold War, 
the struggles of British definition in the Cold War, and the response of the empire to pan-
Arabism and decolonization.  Imbedded in each phase is a perceivable policy shift in 
regard to the canal, generally shifting from dire importance to expendability.  The 
completion of this study will not only show the consistent attachment to the canal, in 
differing forms, but also demonstrate that contrary to general scholarship, the canal 
represented more to the empire than just a gateway to India and was still worth fighting 
for in 1956.  The impetus for this study stems from the tragic story of Sir Anthony Eden 
and why in 1956 he staked his reputation and British world power on confronting Nasser 
over the canal nationalization.  After all, the canal was rightfully Egyptian, the action was 
legal, and with India independent, the necessity of the canal was no longer apparent.  The 
interesting aspect of the attachment to the canal was the canal was run by a private 
company, in which the British Government were a minority shareholder, and was only 
under direct British control during World War I.  By the end of this work, the reasons for 
this importance and place in imperial lore will become clear.  
 11
  In terms of general histories, many were useful, but as with all historical works 
primary documents are the building blocks of any study and no primary source has been 
more useful than Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates.18  While many volumes of Hansard’s 
were consulted in this work, the main focus is on the debates from 1875 to 1882.  These 
debates aid in understanding the formation of the imperial attachment.  By the second 
phase, a sense of imperial attachment to the canal and an elevation to the imperial mantle 
existed, but the initial debates over the canal purchase and later intervention in Egypt are 
most noteworthy.  Additional documentary evidence was obtained through J.C. 
Hurewitz’s Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record.19  
Numerous other primary sources were used in the discussion of the first phase of 
attachment.  The Marquis of Zetland’s Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and Lady 
Bradford proved quite useful in tracing the day to day events of the Disraeli ministry and 
the prime minister’s response to the Suez purchase.  On the topic of Gladstone, the two 
most useful sources were The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord 
Granville 1876-1886 and The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Ministerial 
                                                 
18 The most useful volumes were the following: Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates 1876 Vo. 227 ( London: 
Cornelius Books, 1876 and New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates 
1877 Vol. 234 (London: Cornelius Books, 1877 and New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), Hansard’s 
Parliamentary Debates 1877 Vol. 235 (London: Cornelius Books, 1877 and New York: Kraus Reprint 
Company, 1971), Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates 1878 Vol. 242 (London: Cornelius Books, 1878 and 
New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971),  Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates 1882 Vol. 269 (London: 
Cornelius Books, 1882 and New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates 
1882 Vol. 270 (London: Cornelius Books, 1882 and New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971),  and 
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates Vol. 271 (London: Cornelius Books, 1882 and New York: Kraus Reprint 
Company, 1971). 
19 J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Van Nostrund, 1956. 
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Correspondence, which both yielded insight into the decision to invade Egypt in 1882 
and the varying attempts made to forestall invasion by British forces.20  The latter is also 
noteworthy for its inclusion of Gladstone’s admission that the canal was the only British 
interest in Egypt.21  Also of value was a compilation of the Midlothian Speeches, which 
showcased the anti-Turkish policy of Gladstone’s 1880 Campaign and the supposed 
desire for the infusion of a more moral foreign policy.22  The best primary account of the 
British administrative experience in Egypt is Lord Cromer’s Modern Egypt.23  For a 
supplement to Cromer’s work and address of the day to day routine of British officials in 
Egypt see Lord Edward Cecil’s The Leisure of an Egyptian Official. 24   
There were many primary sources used in the analysis of the second phase of 
attachment and deal with the British experience in World War I and World War II.  No 
discussion of World War I in the Middle East is complete without mention of the fame 
seeking T.E. Lawrence. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph and Revolt in the Desert 
are both useful in their conveyance of Lawrence’s experience in the war; however, it is 
necessary to balance these works out with more recent scholarship since Lawrence tends 
to take credit for the entire victory in the theater.25  Herbert Henry Asquith’s The Genesis 
                                                 
20 H.C.G. Matthew The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Ministerial Correspondence Volume 
X January 1881 to June 1883 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) and Agatha Ramm ed., Political 
Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886,  Volume 1 1870-1882 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1963).  
21 Gladstone to Lord Ripon 9-6-1882 in Matthew, 327.  
22 William Gladstone, Midlothian Speeches 1879 (New York: Humanities Press, 1971). 
23 Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916). 
24 Lord Edward Cecil, The Leisure of an Egyptian Official (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1921). 
25 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, & Co., 
inc., 1936) and T.E. Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert (New York: George H.Doran Company, 1927). 
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of War contains a summary of the events leading up to World War I as well as the text of 
the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.26  The 
particularly useful source on World War II was Winston Churchill’s The Second World 
War, in particular Finest Hour and Hinge of Fate.27   No primary source on World War II 
in North Africa is greater than Viscount Montgomery’s The Memoirs of Field Marshall 
the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein KG, which allows the battle and events leading up 
to and after the battle to be described by the hero of Alamein.28  
The final phase of attachment benefited from a multitude of primary sources.  The 
most useful was Anthony Eden’s Full Circle: the Memoirs of Anthony Eden. 29  More 
than any other man, Eden was involved in and blamed for the disaster at Suez and 
oversaw what many believe to be the death knell of the British Empire. In his memoirs, 
Eden attempts to justify his actions during the Suez Crisis and portray them as successful. 
A different viewpoint is provided by Randolph Churchill’s The Rise and Fall of Sir 
Anthony Eden which amounts to a harangue against Eden’s handling of the Suez Crisis 
and his entire career.30  The biographies of Harold Macmillan provided an invaluable 
assistance and most notably Tides of Fortune 1945-55 and Riding the Storm 1956-59, 
which depict Macmillan’s role in the Suez Crisis and response to the economic crisis that 
                                                 
26 Herbert Henry Asquith, The Genesis of War (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1923). 
27 Winston Churchill, The Second World War Volume 2 Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1949) and Winston Churchill The Second World War Volume 4 the Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1950). 
28 Viscount Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshall, the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG 
(New York: the World Publishing Company, 1958).  
29 Anthony Eden, Full Circle: the Memoirs of Anthony Eden (London: Cassel & Co. Ltd., 1960). 
30 Randolph Churchill, The Rise and Fall of Sir Anthony Eden (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1959). 
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befell Britain during the time of the Suez debacle.31  Additionally, the latter volume gives 
details of Macmillan’s own Government and the process of decolonization.  Evelyn 
Shuckburgh’s Descent to Suez: Foreign Office Diaries 1951- 1956 provides a day by day 
account of the pre-nationalization dealings of Britain in the Middle East as well as the 
memoirs of Eden’s former secretary and Foreign Office Under Secretary dealing with 
Middle Eastern Affairs.32  Shuckburgh was quite close to Eden, in an important 
diplomatic position during the Suez Crisis, and provides an invaluable work with the 
publication of his diary. Selwyn Lloyd’s Suez 1956: A Personal Account includes the 
memoirs of Eden’s Foreign Secretary and the man, along with Eden, given much of the 
blame for the failure of the Suez expedition.33  Edward Heath’s The Course of My Life: 
My Autobiography provides a first hand account of the Suez Conspiracy and the 
Parliamentary reaction to the collusion.34  Robert Murphy’s A Diplomat Among Warriors 
and Chester Cooper’s The Lion’s Last Roar provide the American perspective on the 
crisis and the British decision to intervene.35  Mohamed Heikal’s Cutting the Lion’s Tail: 
Suez Through Egyptian Eyes provides the account of one of Nasser’s closest confidantes 
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and a glimpse into both the mind of Nasser and the Egyptian view of the event.36  The 
most useful account on events in Jordan during this time is John Bagot Glubb’s A Soldier 
with the Arabs which not only demonstrates the importance of the Arab Legion and 
Britain to Transjordan, but also provides a description of Glubb’s dismissal, which served 
to generate Eden’s hatred of Nasser.37  
It would be impossible to master every detail of British imperial history and thus 
certain general texts have been used to supplement the non-Suez related imperial history. 
While primary sources form the basis of this study, numerous secondary sources were 
also consulted.  Lawrence James’ Rise and Fall of the British Empire provided a solid 
overview of the world of the British Empire and also in a condensed version that allowed 
for easy digestion as did Bernard Porter’s The Lion’s Share: a Short History of British 
Imperialism 1850-1970.38  Also, Robert Robinson and John Gallagher’s Africa and the 
Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism yielded not only an excellent commentary 
on British involvement in Egypt and the events at Fashoda, but also provided a 
description of both the moral and economic theories of imperialism.39  Ornamentalism by 
David Cannadine, while not a general history, gave a most invaluable contribution to this 
                                                 
36 Muhammad Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: the Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (New York: Arbor House, 
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38 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) and 
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work through its theory.40  Cannadine holds that the attachment to the empire was 
generated by imposition of the British class system and the creation of parallel social 
systems, which yielded particular attachment to the colonies, dominions, and mandates. 
Furthering this theory is the work of A.P. Thornton in The Imperial Idea and its Enemies 
and its seminal contribution to scholarship on British Imperial thought.41  The most useful 
aspect of this work was Thornton’s assertion that the Middle East was the last place that 
the British could feel imperial and provides a rationale for the British reluctance to 
withdraw from the region.  
With a topic such as this, there is also a need to understand Indian history and pre 
1875 Anglo-Egyptian relations and British Foreign Policy.42  In terms of pre-canal 
history and British involvement in Egypt, the best available source is Edward Ingram’s 
The British Empire as a World Power, which addresses both the repercussions of the 
invasion of 1800, the steps and policy leading to the invasion, and new view of Egypt as 
the key to India, but also develops a conclusion of an empire over Europe approach to 
policy and a brief section on the expansion of the Indian empire under Wellesley.43  
Additionally, Britain in the Middle East by Sarah Searight provides traveler’s accounts of 
Englishmen in the Middle East. Sir Reader Bullard’s Britain and the Middle East from 
the Earliest Times to 1956 furthers Searight’s work in tracing early British contact with 
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the Middle East, but surpasses Searight by its attention to detail and discussion of British 
policy up until the Suez Crisis.44  Several general histories of Egypt and the Ottoman 
Empire during this period were consulted.45  The best work on the topic is John 
Marlowe’s A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 which 
combines the development of post Mameluke Egypt with an appraisal of the diplomatic 
history of British-Egyptian relations.46
 As has already been noted, the first phase was heavily reliant upon Hansard’s and 
other primary sources, but also made use of some secondary sources.  The phase also is 
heavy on sources dealing with Gladstone and Disraeli.  In reference to Disraeli, one must 
always begin with Robert Blake’s Disraeli, by far the best biography ever written about 
Disraeli and an exhaustive account of the life of the mercurial prime minister.47  Also, 
Edgar Feuchtwanger’s Disraeli was a useful source, though more compacted than the 
exhaustive work of Blake.48   For details on the 1882 invasion and the penultimate battle 
of Tel –el Kebir in Egypt see Byron Farwell’s Queen Victoria’s Little Wars.49  
                                                 
44 Sir Reader Bullard, Britain and the Middle East from Earliest Times to 1963 (London: Hutchinson 
University Library, 1964) and Sarah Searight, The British in the Middle East (New York: Atheneum, 
1970). 
45 See William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East  (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1994), 
Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks An Introductory History to 1923 (London: Longman, 1997), and 
Efraim and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: the Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923 
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46 John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (Hamden, CT.: 
Archon Books, 1965).  
47 Robert Blake, Disraeli (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967). 
48 Edward Feuchtwanger, Disraeli (London: Arnold Publishers, 2000). 
49 Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1972). 
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 The second phase encompasses three main events: World War I, interwar 
diplomacy, and World War II.  For works discussing the Suez Canal in World War I see 
the already mentioned works of Marlowe, Hallberg, and Schonfield. The naval race and 
the deterioration of Anglo-German relations are expertly retold in Robert Massie’s 
Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War.50 The work focuses  
on the naval advancements in the pre-war era, but is also useful in its address of all 
aspects of Anglo-German relations.  In terms of general histories of World War I, John 
Keegan’s The First World War was a useful source and provided a coherent summary of 
the Mediterranean theater of World War I and addresses action in the Suez Canal area, 
the Arab revolt, Gallipoli, and Salonika.51  B.H. Liddell Hart’s War in Outline 1914-1918 
also proved very useful.52   Finally, the topic of coping with trench warfare and the actual 
experience of World War I are described in the legendary The Great War and Modern 
Memory by Paul Fussell.53 For a general work on the interwar diplomacy, European 
Diplomacy between the Two Wars 1919-1939, edited by Hans Gatzke, is particularly 
helpful, most notably the sections on the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, Hoare-Laval 
Pact, and the new interpretation of the Munich crisis.54 Robert H Ferrell’s Peace in Their 
Time was useful for its discussion of the Washington Naval Conference.55 Ian Nish’s 
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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period provided information on the termination 
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.56 For secondary information on the Second World War, 
see John Keegan’s The Second World War. 57  
In terms of the Middle East in World War I and the subsequent establishment of 
the mandate system, there are several noteworthy works.  The story of Allenby and his 
role in the Middle East is expertly told in Brian Gardner’s Allenby of Arabia: Lawrence’s 
General, which is based on the traveling lecture tour of the postwar era.58  Another 
noteworthy achievement of the previously mentioned works of Lawrence was to generate 
a further Romantic attachment to the region, which is also apparent in the works of 
Rudyard Kipling, most notably Kim which portrayed the romantic land and happenings 
beyond the Suez Canal.59 E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India, while not specifically 
commenting upon the Middle East, does attach a certain romantic aura to the canal.60  
Bruce Westrate provides an indispensable study of the Arab Bureau and the struggle 
between London, Cairo, and Delhi for dominance in shaping the policy in the Middle 
East in his The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East 1916-1920.61  The end 
result of the lands seized from the Ottoman Empire and the struggle between the India 
Office and Foreign Office is found in Briton Cooper Busch’s Britain, India, and the 
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Arabs, 1914-1921, which outlines the intentions of the India Office to claim 
Mesopotamia as part of their imperial sphere.62 The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the 
ramifications of this agreement are detailed in David Fromkin’s A Peace to End All 
Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East.63  
Also, the establishment of the British protectorate over Egypt and the accompanying text 
can be found in Hurewitz.  Additional aid was rendered by Byron Farwell’s The Great 
War in Africa which depicts the struggle for colonies in Africa during World War I, 
which served to tie down British troops in the pursuit of Lettow-Voorbeck.64
The interwar period is best exemplified by the gravitation between two topics: 
British Foreign and Defense Policy and the British Empire in the Middle East.  Interwar 
policy in Egypt can be best found by consulting the works of Marlowe and any of the 
general histories on the Suez Canal, most notably Schonfield. The most important 
possessions were Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan.  These lands were under direct British 
control for a period of time and after their independence were dominated by Britain, 
earning the title informal empire.  The quintessential work on this portion of British 
Imperial history is Elizabeth Monroe’s Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914-
1971.65  Daniel Silverfarb’s Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East: A Case Study 
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of Iraq 1929-1941 provides a glimpse of the strategic importance of Iraq and the process 
of Iraqi independence through the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, in addition to the Iraqi 
insurgency/ attack on the Royal Air Force (RAF) base at Habbayynia.66 The best work on 
British administered Iraq is Peter Sluglett’s Britain in Iraq 1914-1932 which provides a 
detailed study of the creation of the state of Iraq and the numerous issues dealt with by 
the British.67  In terms of Transjordan, Mary Wilson’s King Abdullah, Britain, and the 
Making of Jordan provides a useful survey of the state building process and happenings 
in Transjordan after the First World War.68  Palestine is an overwhelming topic and it is 
not the point of this paper to enter into the quagmire that is Palestinian history. Several 
histories of Israel, Palestine, and the Palestine Mandate were consulted for this thesis.69  
The interwar period is of vital importance for the imperial attachment to the Suez 
Canal, particularly in the multitude of shifts in importance of the canal in British policy. 
Two areas of research in terms of this topic exist dealing with the Mediterranean strategy 
of the British Empire during the interwar period and the military policy of the British 
Empire in the post-war era.  In terms of British military policy, the decline and neglect of 
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the army is described in Brian Bond’s British Military Policy Between the Two World 
Wars.70  The work describes the disdain for militarism in the postwar era in Britain and 
the implementation of the Cardwell system and the Ten Year Rule by the British military, 
which showcases not only the embracing of the spirit of Locarno and Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, but also shows the apathy described by Fussell.  The Great Powers in the Middle 
East 1919-1939 demonstrates the waning paramountcy of Britain in the Middle East after 
World War I and the gradual intrusion and competition of Italy and Germany in the 
region, in addition to discussing the initial American forays into the region.71  The Suez 
Canal underwent a diminution in importance in the interwar era and this is best illustrated 
by Lawrence Pratt’s East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis 1936-
1939 and Steven Morewood’s “Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in 
British Defense Strategy 1919-1941.”72  Both works address the Mediterranean crisis and 
the British decision to focus on a Far Eastern Strategy based out of Singapore in addition 
to holding the Mediterranean.  Also, Pratt discusses the Abyssinian crisis in depth and the 
sense of British weakness where they felt unable to compete with the Italians in war.  
Morewood and Pratt both convey the difficulty facing Britain and the possibility of a 
three front war, and the gradual shift back to a “Mediterranean First” strategy.  These 
issues are furthered by Martin Kolinsky’s Britain’s War in the Middle East: Strategy and 
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Diplomacy 1936-1942 which discusses the origination of the doctrine of self-sufficiency 
for Egyptian defense and the drastic policy shift between the 1937 Imperial Conference 
favoring a Far Eastern defense strategy and the 1939 St. James Conference focusing on 
Mediterranean defense.73  
The description of World War II in the Middle East draws from the work of 
Keegan on the topic and is bolstered by Martins Gilbert’s definitive biography Winston 
Churchill, in particular volumes six and seven Finest Hour and The Road to Victory.74 
Another useful work is Roy Jenkins Churchill: A Biography.75  The imperative victory at 
El Alamein is expertly detailed in John Bierman and Colin Smith’s The Battle of 
Alamein: Turning Point of the War which provides every conceivable detail of the battle 
and the North African campaign.76  The failure of the Singapore strategy and the doomed 
naval demonstration is described in Christopher Bell’s “The Singapore Strategy and the 
Deterrence of Japan: Winston Churchill, the Admiralty, and the Dispatch of Force Z.”77 
The failure of an Atlantic Alliance cooperative strategy in the Far East is described in 
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Nicholas Clifford’s “Britain, America, and the Far East 1937-1940: a Failure in 
Cooperation.”78
  The third phase from 1945 to 1956 deals with three main topics: decolonization, 
Britain in the Cold War, and the Suez Crisis.  The most useful source is William Roger 
Louis’ The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United 
States, and Postwar Imperialism.79  This superb work highlights the challenges facing 
Britain in the postwar era from within the Middle East and the need to re-define the role 
of the empire in the new world order.  The work also provides an excellent survey of the 
policy of the Attlee Government towards the Middle East and their dealing with the 
Palestine issue and the rise of Egyptian Nationalism.  Further useful works on the British 
Empire in the Middle East and decolonization in general are D. George Boyce’s 
Decolonization and the British Empire 1775-1997 and John Darwin’s Britain and 
Decolonization: the Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World.80  The ultimate demise of 
the British Empire and the withdrawal from Aden, Sudan, and the Persian Gulf is 
described in Glen Balfour-Paul’s The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s 
Relinquishment of Power in her last Three Dependencies.81  The struggle to find a 
postwar role and define her world power status was a constant worry for Britain in the 
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postwar world.  There was gravitation between establishing itself as a superpower on par 
with the United State and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or to be powerful through 
the Atlantic Alliance.  This dilemma had some bearing in the decision to stay in the 
Middle East and to stand guard against any Soviet incursion.  This attitude and struggle 
for definition are described in the aforementioned Louis work, Glubb’s Britain and the 
Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1958, Ingram’s British Empire as a World Power, 
and C.J. Bartlett’s British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century.82  A useful work on 
the Attlee Government’s foreign policy is Kenneth Morgan’s Labour in Power 1945-
1951.83
There are several secondary sources on the leaders and events of the Suez Crisis.  
A supplement to Eden’s own biography is Robert Rhodes James’ Anthony Eden: A 
Biography, which is a thorough account of the life of Eden; Eden’s own work only covers 
his career in the second Churchill Government, his Ministry, and the Suez Crisis.84 Peter 
Hahn’s The U.S., Great Britain and Egypt 1945-56: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early 
Cold War describes the Suez Crisis in terms of the Cold War and the British action as 
driving the Egyptians into the arms of the USSR, thus scuttling American efforts to 
prevent a Soviet incursion into the Middle East.85  Suez 1956: the Crisis and Its 
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Consequences edited by William Roger Louis and Roger Owen provides a beneficial set 
of articles analyzing the crisis from every aspect and arguing that economics ultimately 
doomed the British to failure.86  Leon Epstein’s British Politics During the Suez Crisis is 
intended as a work of political science and ultimately derides the British system of 
government and the inevitable disappearance of a two party British political system.87  
However, the work is indispensable for its use of Suez as a case study and provision of 
newspaper polls over the crisis.  Epstein also suggests that the role of the Suez as a focal 
point for British victories in the Middle East during both World Wars made it impossible 
to dispense with the canal and describes the Suez Group of the Conservative Party which 
seized on this issue as recourse for their desire for an old empire. The references to Suez 
as semblant to Munich are to be found in Macmillan, Eden, and Lloyd.  A personal 
reflection on the Suez Crisis and its discussion in a family setting is described in 
Cannadine.  A very interesting article, Martin Francis’ “Tears, Tantrums, and Bared 
Teeth: the Emotional Economy of Three Prime Ministers, 1951-1963,” suggests the 
emphasis of stoic calm and lack of emotion as a public persona as undertaken by 
Churchill, Eden, and Macmillan.88  This need to “hold it in” resorted in the breakdowns 
and outbursts of Eden during the Suez Crisis.  The issue of the media and newspaper 
coverage of the Suez Crisis is addressed in the following two articles: Ralph Negrin’s 
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“The Press and the Suez Crisis” and Guillaume Parmentier’s “The British Press in the 
Suez Crisis.”89  
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Chapter II 
 Disraeli’s Coup and Gladstone’s Reluctant Intervention: Imperial Attachment to 
the Canal 1875-1914  
 
 
 In 1875 Queen Victoria termed the Suez Canal share purchase a great event in 
modern politics and the purchase itself was a triumph for Disraeli.1 The canal formed a 
vital component of British policy and cemented the ultimate association of Britain with 
Egypt. The rationale for this purchase predated the canal itself and two main events 
shaped this relationship: the French invasion of 1800 and the Great Revolt of 1857. The 
French invasion caused great fear in Great Britain. This invasion demonstrated that Egypt 
represented an Achilles’ heel of the British Empire and threatened India. The Great 
Revolt showed the tenuous nature of the British hold on India under the East India 
Company and the need to secure the crown jewel of the empire. While the bulk of this 
section focuses on British policy and its attachment towards the canal from 1875 to 1914, 
the two pre-canal events are discussed in detail. Upon completion of this overview, the 
main events of British policy towards the canal in the first phase of attachment will be 
explored: the share purchase, dual control, the 1882 invasion, the Baghdadbahn, and the 
pre World War I diplomatic state of affairs in the Mediterranean world. 
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 In 1798, the importance of Egypt to the British became evident due to the French 
invasion of Egypt. France invaded Egypt as a way to crush England, rob her of 
commerce, and cripple the empire.2 Napoleon remarked, “the time is not far distant when 
we shall feel that in order to really destroy England, it is necessary for us to possess 
Egypt.”3 After it became known that British troops would be required to subdue the 
French force in Egypt, Britain dispatched her troops to Egypt. This action demonstrated 
that when faced with the preservation of Indian security or Continental influence, the 
British Government opted for defense of India. After the eventual expulsion of the French 
force in 1802, historian Edward Ingram believes the British maintained their presence at 
Malta not only to show their desire to stay in the region, but also to separate Europe from 
the empire as much as possible.4 By maintaining the base at Malta, the British hoped to 
control the routes to the empire and prevent European matters from resulting in attacks on 
her imperial possessions overseas. The French invasion demonstrated that Egypt could be 
a matter of consequence to European affairs.5 At this point, the Suez land bridge and the 
preservation of communications with India became the most important element in British 
strategic planning in Asia, long before the canal was even built. 6 In the 1830s, the British 
used steamships and a regular steam and land route between Suez and Alexandria to 
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improve communications with India.7 The new Suez route shortened the passage from 
England to India to forty days, compared with five months round the Cape.8 Britain did 
not want other European states to control this vital route. The French invasion provided 
the impetus for Britain to begin entrenchment in the Eastern Mediterranean and led Tsar 
Nicholas I to remark to the French Ambassador to the Russian Empire that: 
The English have their eyes on Egypt. The country is necessary to them on 
account of the new line of communication they seek to open with India. 
They are establishing themselves in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.9
 
In the mid nineteenth century, the British became locked in a territorial rivalry with the 
Russians over interests in Central Asia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Far East.10 Britain 
decided upon a forward defense strategy for the Middle East and wanted to use trade and 
sea power to secure defense goals in the region and to use the Ottoman Empire as a 
buffer against both Russia and France.11 Britain also expected any challenge to their 
influence in the Middle East to come from sea and concentrated on a naval defense 
strategy.12 While the invasion led to an interest in the region for the safety of India, 
events in India led to the region becoming of utter importance.  
 The British intervened in Egypt and remained at Malta to guard India from her 
European rivals. But events in India in 1857 further necessitated the British attachment to 
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Egypt and the later canal. The Great Revolt presented the gravest challenge to British 
control of India and resulted in the direct imposition of crown control.  The popular view 
considers the revolt to have arisen out of the rumor that cartridges issued to Indian troops 
were greased with animal fat, a practice repugnant to the Muslim and Hindu soldiers of 
the Indian army. In actuality, taxes, denial of Foreign Service positions, religious reasons, 
future opportunities, and a desire to reclaim the conquests of the East India Company 
sparked the mutiny.13 The revolt began in late May 1857 and the mutineers captured 
Delhi and reinstalled the Mughal dynasty as rulers of India.14 The revolt spread. Sepoys 
turned on their officers. Rebels besieged British forces and civilians in the cities of Agra, 
Cawnpore, and Lucknow. British reinforcements as well as reinforcements from 
garrisons throughout the eastern empire arrived by the end of July.15 By 1858 the British 
crushed the revolt, abolished the Mughal dynasty, and instituted direct crown control.16 
Britain needed India for troops and India also supplied raw materials, foodstuffs, and 
manufactured goods to the Home Islands, in addition to being a source of money and a 
market.17 India made Britain a world power and the Great Revolt demonstrated the 
dangers that could arise in India.  
 Prior to the Suez Canal construction, the British concluded that Egypt provided 
the key to the gateway to India. The prospect of an enemy controlling the Egyptian land 
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route constituted a viable threat to India. Additionally, the Great Revolt proved to Britain 
that it was necessary to have a quick route to India for the sake of dispatching 
reinforcements in times of trouble. When the canal was completed in 1869, the 
immediate beneficiary was Britain, who constituted the majority of the shipping through 
the canal. The British had already exhibited a willingness to sacrifice Continental 
influence for imperial safety and the canal proved a vital conduit for trade to her eastern 
empire. Once the canal became vital for trade to India, it became vital for Britain to 
control the canal.18 The French invasion and the Great Revolt demonstrated to France 
what Britain would do to protect India. The opening of the canal would further test the 
British commitment to Indian defense. 
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the resulting British trade through the 
canal laid the foundation for the imperial attachment to the canal. The British had 
strategic and commercial interests in the canal. The idea of a canal was initially regarded 
as a French military weapon in Britain and events on the Continent were not going well 
for the empire.19 Imperial pride underwent a renewal with the election of Benjamin 
Disraeli as Prime Minister in 1874.  He was widely regarded as the “defender of empire” 
and concerned with ships, commerce, and colonies.20 Disraeli purchased the canal shares, 
sent Indian troops to Malta to sway the Russians on the Treaty of San Stefano, and took 
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other actions for the sake of defending the sea lanes and India. 21 The interesting decision 
was the canal share purchase in 1875 since a Colonial Office official had referred to the 
Cape Route as the center of the empire in 1871.22 While an obvious reason was the 
security of India, trade was also a vital concern. By the end of his Ministry, Disraeli had 
laid the foundation for the imperial attachment to the canal. 
The opening of the canal and the years leading up to the purchase saw an 
overwhelming British gain from the canal. In 1870, 486 ships carrying 436,609 net tons 
passed through the canal of which 314 ships and 289,234 tons were British.23 In 1871, out 
of 761,467 net tons of canal traffic 546,453 were British.24 In 1872 1,160,744 tons passed 
through the canal; 854,037 British.25 In 1873, 1,367,768 tons went through the canal; 
994,331 British.26 The following year 1,631,650 tons passed through the canal with 
1,200,022 destined for or from Britain.27 The year of the share purchase Britain 
accounted for 1,476,775 tons of the canal’s annual total of 2,009,984.28 In terms of 
tonnage by flag, Britain accounted for the majority of the transit with France having a 
tiny fraction of the total British shipping.29 Roughly 4/5 of Suez traffic was British and 
the abundance of British trade passing through the canal was one of the main reasons for 
                                                 
21 Ibid., and Robert Blake, Disraeli (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), 643. 
22 Robert Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism 
(London: MacMillan & Co. LTD., 1965), 59. 






29 Ibid., 206-7. 
 34
the share purchase. 30 The security of India was also a reason since the canal had nearly 
halved the distance from India to England.31 In case of any disturbances similar to the 
Great Revolt, the time for dispatching reinforcements was quicker and allowed a quicker 
suppression of threats to the crown jewel of the empire. Finally and perhaps most 
importantly, the value of the canal to Britain for both commerce and security had become 
apparent in the early 1870s, but the canal was still controlled by a French dominated 
company and Egypt by the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of London of 1841 provided for 
a hereditary governorship (khedive) of Egypt which owed tribute to the Ottoman 
Government.32While Egypt was semi-autonomous, the Khedive owed allegiance to the 
Ottoman Sultan.33
 The financial success of the Suez Canal was in doubt in 1871 and the Egyptian 
investment in the canal appeared to be more of a burden than a benefit. The Egyptian 
government had paid eight million pounds for fifteen percent of the net profits of the 
canal.34 By 1871, the value of canal shares had dropped from Fr.500 to Fr.208 and the 
Egyptian government was struggling financially.35 Khedive Ismail, who had lived 
lavishly and spent lavishly during the Egyptian cotton boom, sought a buyer for his 
shares of the canal. Ismail accumulated an average debt of seven million pounds per year 
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and became unable to make payments in 1875.36 He arranged a purchase option to be 
offered to a French banker and for the Disraeli government to hear of this offer. 37 
Disraeli heard of this offer and protested to the French Government that Britain would 
object to the canal being wholly controlled by the French. The French Government was 
reeling from the crushing defeat of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War and allowed the option 
to lapse. Thus roughly forty percent of the canal shares were up for sale and Disraeli 
faced both a dilemma and an opportunity. 
 While the French had bypassed the option to gain the entire controlling interest in 
the canal no guarantee existed that the opportunity might not be seized by another British 
opponent. Additionally the value of the canal to trade and Indian security was well 
known. Disraeli was determined that no country should control the Khedive’s shares and 
believed that the canal was vital to the British Empire.38  After the French rejection of the 
Egyptian offer, General Stanton the British Consul-General in Egypt informed the 
Egyptian government that “Her Majesty’s Government are disposed to purchase the 
shares if satisfactory terms can be arranged.”39 The Egyptians offered the shares to 
Britain for the sum of four million pounds sterling and the offer was conveyed to the 
Disraeli government on November 23, 1875, with an addendum that an answer was 
required by November 25. On November 24, Lord Derby wired Stanton to close on the 
offer. The government funded the purchase through a banking house founded by the 
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Rothschilds and the purchase was approved while Parliament was not in session.40 
Despite the sidestepping of Parliament, the Disraeli Government had acquired nearly half 
of the canal shares. 
 Disraeli was exceptionally proud of himself and conveyed his self congratulation 
in a letter to Lady Bradford: 
After a fortnight of most uneasing labor and anxiety for between ourselves 
and ourselves only I may be egotistical in this matter I have purchased for 
England the Khedive of Egypt’s interest in the Suez Canal … had this not 
been done the whole of the canal could have been French.41
 
Disraeli believed he had scored a tremendous victory for the empire by preventing the 
French from controlling the canal. He furthered his self acclaim by conveying Queen 
Victoria’s sentiments about the purchase. Noting the Queen was happy about the 
purchase, she also told Disraeli the purchase was “a great event in modern politics.”42 
The purchase had been a triumph for Disraeli. The purchase was a calculated step to 
strengthen the empire and gave England a financial footing in Egypt thereby allowing her 
to prevent any other country from obtaining exclusive control over the canal.43 The 
purchase also led the press to view the canal as an indispensable highway of empire and 
the British public cheered the purchase.44 The canal was a success for Disraeli even 
though the purchase placed the British Government in the awkward position of being a 
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minority shareholder in a French Company.45 In spite of this awkwardness, the canal 
purchase was a triumph and as historian D.A. Farnie stated the issue, “Egypt became 
almost an appendage to the necessary stepping stone to India and increased in value as a 
dependent line of empire.46  The Cheltenham Free Press conveyed the importance of the 
purchase by printing “Egypt is as necessary to England as Alsace Lorraine is to 
Germany.”47 Disraeli had secured the vital link to the empire and the canal became a 
foremost interest for the British. Yet Disraeli still had a hurdle to clear when Parliament 
reconvened in February. 
 In February 1876 the House of Commons met to debate the share purchase. They 
sanctioned the purchase, but not before the government was called to task for the 
impetuous nature of the purchase without Commons consultation. Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Northcote began the debate by providing a short history of the canal and the 
benefit to England: 
Now this great enterprise is one from which its first inception has attracted 
the attention of this country … The canal has been made, has been opened, 
and has been proven a great advantage to England.48
 
The Chancellor criticized the initial British disinvolvement from the canal and professed 
that the benefit of the canal had deemed that this mighty enterprise should be controlled 
by Britain. Despite the language of destiny, the root message was the shares were British 
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and now so was the canal. He furthered this assertion by touting the benefit to India and 
reading a statement from the India Office, in which the canal’s influence on British 
relations with India was stated as two-fold: 
Its influence on our relations with India is twofold- administration and 
commercial. The administration has greatly benefited by the additional 
facilities afforded for the transport of troops to and from India.49  
 
The economic benefit of the canal was well known to the MPs in Commons and 
Northcote stressed the imperial benefit and how the canal aided the administration and 
protection of India. During the remainder of his speech, Northcote stated that “it is of 
great importance that we should make the best provisions we can for securing 
uninterrupted passage to India and our Eastern possessions.”50 His most telling statement 
was, 
It is destined to be an eternal possession of the human race; and I am sure 
be a proud satisfaction to us if England fulfills her proper part in securing 
and consolidating this great enterprise.51
 
Northcote cited four reasons for the purchase. The first was the obvious commercial 
benefit stemming from the trade with India and the British holdings in Australasia. The 
second was the security of the Indian Empire and benefit to holding the eastern 
possessions of the empire. Both of these reasons were apparent to the members of 
Commons. However, the other two reasons were more tenuous. The notion of destiny 
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was unexpected and attempted to provide Britain with a non-political reason for 
purchasing the shares. The last reason, the benefit to humanity, wedged the purchase of 
the shares into the greater imperial mission, presumably to make the share purchase 
tolerable to the Liberals. It would only make sense that the British Empire, being the 
greatest power on earth, controlled the canal. While some flowery embellishment on 
Northcote’s part existed, Disraeli was more practical: 
I have always and do now recommend it to the country as a political 
transaction and one which I believe is calculated to the strengthen the 
empire … we are obtaining a great hold and interest in this important 
position, because they believe that it secures to us a highway to our Indian 
empire and other dependences.52
 
Disraeli provided the clearest rationale for the purchase, which was alluded to in his first 
letter to Lady Bradford: empire. The calls of destiny and imperial mission served to 
invest the canal with a high place in the imperial mind and to also give the purchase a 
more moral/elevated reason for the purchase. Yet as soon as the canal became vital for 
trade, it became vital for England to control it.53 The safety of India and the commercial 
benefit of trade strengthened the empire. As Disraeli later demonstrated, the canal could 
also be used to deploy the powerful Indian army into Europe if necessary, as was done at 
Malta in 1878. Disraeli informed Lady Bradford of the threat of French control of the 
canal, but the French could just as much close the canal as they could close the Straits of 
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Gibraltar.54 If either were done, the French would be displaced by the powerful British 
Navy and a landing force composed of both the British Army and Indian Army. In  
addition, France was still reeling from her defeat in 1870 and was presumably unable to 
risk such an endeavor. The belief soon arose that if there was no canal there would be no 
India.55 Britain had become the canal’s biggest client by 1875 and the economic benefit 
and benefit for controlling India were tied to the canal. The purchase also served to keep 
a British voice in the management of the French dominated Suez Canal Company.56 Thus 
Disraeli purchased the canal shares to strengthen the empire. Because of the purchase the 
canal “was disassociated from Egypt in the English mind.”57
 In terms of British political thought after the initial euphoria, the canal suffered a 
relative diminution in stature in relation to other concerns. Disraeli noted in 1876 that 
Constantinople was the key to India not Egypt and the Suez Canal.58 The Russo-Turkish 
war of 1877 and the possible collapse of the Ottoman Empire created the possibility of 
Russian domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. This threat would persist until World 
War I.  If Russia controlled the Eastern Mediterranean and the Straits, the strategic value 
of the canal would be lost and the eastern portion of the empire threatened. In addition, 
the First Report of the Royal Commission on Colonial Defense noted:  
the general result of these inquiries is that the security of the Suez route might 
under certain contingencies become very precarious and the risk attendant on 
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sending commercial ships through it so great as practically to preclude it use in 
which case the long sea route would be the only one available.59
 
The Suez Canal was subject to local disturbances and was not surrounded by British 
dominated territory as the Cape Route. Additionally, the British had no desire to get 
involved in Egyptian affairs not related to the canal. Disraeli supported the Ottomans as a 
way to buttress any Russian incursion into the Middle East and Egypt was under the 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. While the canal had been dissociated from Egypt in 
the British mind, the next decade proved the opposite and interwove the canal interests of 
Britain with the affairs of the tumultuous state of Egypt. 
 By 1882, events served to bring the British into Egyptian affairs and resulted in 
their permanent presence on Egyptian soil. The Egyptian debt began to expand in 1876. 
In that year her foreign loan debt rose to sixty eight million pounds, her internal loans 
were fourteen and a half million pounds with a fourteen million pound floating debt.60 
The debt arose from the Westernizing policies of Said and Ismail, which saw great 
increases in the amount of rail and telegraph lines, canals, and cultivable land.61 Egypt 
was going bankrupt and Europe was losing its investment in Egypt. While the 
improvements were great, the Egyptian Government financed these projects through 
European loans and the improvements were nullified by the expenditures. In particular, 
Ismail attempted to improve the Egyptian infrastructure along European lines and was 
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buoyed by the Egyptian cotton boom during the American Civil War. Unfortunately, the 
end of the American Civil War ended the Egyptian cotton boom. The British share 
purchase temporarily stemmed this trend, but in 1876 the growing insolvency of the 
Egyptian government led European investors to dispatch the Cave Mission. Stephen 
Cave, a British MP, was sent to Egypt in 1876 to investigate the financial situation. He 
reported that Egypt was in a critical financial state.62 The situation became critical in 
1878 and the French communicated to the British Foreign Minister Lord Derby that if the 
two governments did not act together the matter was in danger of slipping out of their 
control.63 The British and French governments appointed a joint Commission of Enquiry 
and when Ismail formed an international cabinet with both the French and British 
Commissioners as members of the cabinet, the action shocked the Commission. Ismail 
took steps to remove the influence of the commissioners and felt their inclusion had 
pacified the two European governments. The flouting of European advice and negligent 
financial practices led the British and French to push for Ismail’s abdication. Despite 
numerous calls for his willing abdication, Ismail determined to stay in power. The Anglo-
French turned to the Ottoman Sultan who delivered a firman of deposition to Ismail on 
June 25, 1879.64 The Ottoman Government appointed Ismail’s son Tawfiq khedive. 
Britain pressured France to refrain from influencing Egyptian affairs after the deposition, 
but the French maintained a presence and the Egyptians appointed controllers. These 
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controllers, the British controller being Evelyn Baring later Lord Cromer, were to be 
present at Cabinet meetings, demand information, give advice, and report to their 
diplomatic representatives if the Egyptian Government failed to heed their advice.65 The 
foreign investors acting through their governments later established an international 
commission to evaluate the debt and it resulted in the Law of Liquidation calling for 
roughly half of Egypt’s annual income of eighty million five hundred thousand pounds to 
be earmarked for debt repayment.66 It became the duty of the controllers to administer 
Egyptian finances to repay the debt and those two controllers became the bankers of the 
Egyptian Government. The debts of Egypt had grown to such an extent to cause the 
deposition of a Khedive in 1879 and British and French controllers installed to oversee 
finances. The establishment of Dual Control not only demonstrated the power of the 
British and French in regard to influencing Egypt, but it also laid the groundwork for the 
1881-1882 Arabi revolt. Dual Control resembled Anglo-French suzerainty over Egypt 
and led to resentment in the country over foreign dominance.67
 While the British oversaw the finances of Egypt, the canal still held a paramount 
interest. In 1877, Lord Derby had noted that “maintenance of uninterrupted 
communication of the canal is in our view a British interest, one of the highest 
importance, and one which we feel it is our duty not to neglect.”68 He later stated that the 
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canal is “too grave and delicate a matter to be dealt with in an offhand manner.”69 Lord 
Derby made these statements in response to the Russo-Turkish War and the threat to 
Egypt, but Egypt was never threatened. The importance is that the canal, despite the 
findings of the Colonial Defense Report and Disraeli’s Constantinople statement, was 
still vitally important to Britain and her empire. British policy remained to control and 
protect the canal and to avoid Egyptian entanglements, but the British had been drawn 
into by the issue of Dual Control. Lord Cromer noted that the British policy in 1879 was 
to not possess Egypt, but also to make sure no other country possessed it.70 The detriment 
was that while the Suez Canal was still important and the Dual Control did not represent 
actual control, the presence of foreign domination fomented subversion in Egypt and left 
Britain with the choice of having to determine how much the canal was worth to its 
empire.  
 The British maintained the policy of using the Ottoman Empire to buttress any 
threat to the region, particularly by Russia, but this changed in 1880 with the election of 
William Gladstone and the Liberals to Government.71 Gladstone gained office by seizing 
upon the atrocities in Bulgaria as a cause of interest to the British electorate. Gladstone 
was also anti-Turk and accused Disraeli of annexing Egypt.72 Gladstone was less likely to 
favor the pro-Constantinople strategy of Disraeli and opposed more territorial acquisition 
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believing a more moral foreign policy was the best pursuit of the British government. He 
understood the canal as preserving the maintenance and security of empire and had 
announced this view in 1859.73 However, the new government was less likely to further 
British involvement in Egypt and desired avoiding any foreign entanglements such as 
Disraeli had in Zululand and Afghanistan. This shift away from direct action and 
militancy was passing and the Gladstone Government drew up contingency plans for an 
invasion of Egypt in the wake of the French seizure of Tunis in 1881.74 The ready 
acceptance of intervention by Gladstone’s Cabinet and Gladstone’s ultimate acceptance 
show the importance of the canal to British defense policy. It appears that while 
Gladstone would not indulge in the multitude of wars that Disraeli did, he would act to 
defend vital interests and India. The Gladstone Ministry became involved in Egypt in 
1882 and this involvement proved the extreme importance of the Suez Canal to Britain 
since a pacifist government was willing to invade Egypt. 
 The troubles began with the forced abdication of Ismail and his replacement by 
the more pliable Tawfiq.75 With Tawfiq’s accession the controllers exerted almost total 
control over Egypt and the Law of Liquidation called for heavy taxes in Egypt, with half 
the revenue going to the debt.76 What developed from an Egyptian point of view was the 
Europeans had entered Egyptian politics, overthrew/forced out the legitimate Khedive, 
and laid exorbitant taxes on the Egyptian population. Several bases of opposition arose, 
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most importantly Constitutionalism and discord among the native Egyptian officers of the 
army.77 Ismail had been able to quash this discontent, but the combination of Tawfiq, 
who was not as strong as Ismail, and the proliferation of European influence exacerbated 
the discontent and allowed it to manifest itself in the political realm. The Egyptian army 
led the way. Ismail was in the process of raising the size of the army to sixty thousand, 
but the Dual Control and Tawfiq insisted on a reduction to eighteen thousand and many 
officers lost their careers.78 Ahmad Arabi emerged as the officers’ leader. He proved 
instrumental in forcing Tawfiq to appoint one of their candidates Minister of War and 
invited the Constitutionalists to form a government.79 The success of the officers against 
Tawfiq demonstrated the disfavor afforded Tawfiq in Egypt and their actions revealed 
him to be a puppet of the British and the French, essentially only the efforts of the British 
and French governments allowed Tawfiq to remain in power. The officers’ movement 
was profoundly anti-foreign targeting the old Turco-Circassian elite of the Egyptian army 
and the Europeans. The Turco-Circassian elite dated to the times of Mohamad Ali and 
controlled the army, preventing native Egyptians from attaining command positions. 
These non-Egyptian elites were the first targets of the officer’s movement.  The British 
faced a possible insurgency and missed a chance for pacification when the French 
Government of Gambetta forced the Gladstone Ministry to deny the Constitutionalist 
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demand to vote on the budget and have input on Egyptian finances.80 By this rejection, 
the Europeans drove the Constitutionalist Government of Egypt closer to the Army and 
set the stage for further anti-foreign threats to Tawfiq’s authority. 
 The disturbance and challenge to Khedival authority began to worry the 
Gladstone Government.  In October 1881, Gladstone wrote to Lord Granville that the 
Ottomans should handle the revolt.  Under this plan, the only European involvement 
would be the dispatch of a joint squadron.81 Despite his anti-Turkish policy and the 
weakening of the Anglo-Ottoman alliance, Gladstone was not about to place Britain in a 
situation necessitating the invasion of Egypt. A need to pacify the nationalists and restore 
the authority of Tawfiq existed, but it was not the responsibility of Britain. On January 4, 
1882, the Governments of Britain and France issued a Joint Note calling for Khedival 
support, protection of the bondholders, all of which served to threaten the Nationalists.82 
The Joint Note stressed the British and French support for Tawfiq and implied Anglo-
French action or intervention if Tawfiq’s power was threatened. The threat of 
intervention is conveyed in the following: 
 I have accordingly instructed you to declare to the Khedive that the 
British and French Governments consider the maintenance of His 
Highness on the throne, on the terms laid down in the Sultan’s firman and 
officially recognized by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee, 
for the present and future, the good order and development of general 
prosperity in Egypt in which France and Great Britain are equally 
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interested. The two Governments, being closely associated in their resolve 
to guard, by their united efforts, against all causes of complication, 
internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in 
Egypt, do not doubt the assurance publicly given of their fixed intention in 
this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the 
Khedive might be exposed and which would certainly find England and 
France united to oppose them.83
 
The Egyptians reacted swiftly and the Chamber of Notables began to fall in line with the 
army and called for budget voting rights and an increase in the size of the army. The 
Chamber of Notables sided with the army after the issue of the Joint Note and the threat 
of foreign intervention in the governance of Egypt. On February 3, the Egyptian 
Government resigned and a new government formed with Arabi as Minister of War.84 
With Arabi in office and the government at his behest, the controllers could not control 
the finances. The British and French Governments believed intervention was necessary to 
protect the lives and property of their citizens in Egypt and sought Ottoman assistance.85 
When the Ottomans decided against intervention, the British and French agreed to send 
naval squadrons to Alexandria to protect their subjects and with the fleet’s arrival the 
trouble escalated. 86 The presence of the fleet was intended to dissuade attacks on 
European property. 
 Any chance for a peaceful settlement without British intervention had been lost 
with the Joint Note and the arrival of the Anglo-French squadron. The new government 
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that included Arabi became convinced that it was at risk, but it also had grown powerful 
enough to nullify Khedival authority and eliminate the Dual Control. The British 
squadron had orders to protect their subjects while the French instructed their fleet to 
merely give moral support to the Khedive. 87 On June 10, anti-foreign riots broke out in 
Alexandria killing fifty non-Egyptians. The crisis escalated beyond repair and at the 
beginning of July the Egyptians constructed coastal fortifications and re-enforced the 
garrison in Alexandria. Admiral Seymour received instructions from the Cabinet on July 
5, 1882 that in the event of war a warning should be given and the Alexandria 
fortifications destroyed.88 On July 6, Seymour warned British subjects to leave Egypt. 
The stage was set for Seymour to issue an ultimatum to raze the fortifications. On July 5, 
Gladstone instructed First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Northbrook to inform ships using 
the canal what was occurring, thus attempting to preserve the safety and neutrality of the 
canal.89 Admiral Seymour issued an ultimatum for the construction of coastal 
fortifications to be halted on July 9 since the forts posed a danger to the British fleet. 
When no reply came, he shelled Alexandria and destroyed the forts on July 11. The 
shelling led to anarchy in Egypt and the British feared that the canal was threatened. On 
July 14 Gladstone wrote to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, John Bright, that Arabi 
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had brought the revolt upon himself.90 British forces occupied Alexandria on July 24 and 
anarchy swept Egypt endangering the canal. 
 Gladstone and his cabinet approved the dispatch of the army to Egypt in a July 20 
meeting and the intervention began.91 Gladstone was not intervening simply for the safety 
of the bondholders, but to re-establish order and for the sake of imperial, Indian, and 
maritime interests.92 The Indian army had been put on alert on June 20 for possible action 
in the Suez area.93 Sir Garnet Wolseley commanded the military expedition that landed at 
the canal. His force was comprised of 35,000 British troops and 6,000 Indian troops.94 
The canal had been endangered by the revolt and the Khedive authorized the British 
troops to seize Isthmian points that were necessary to safeguard the canal.95 The father of 
the canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps feared British control of his creation and telegraphed 
Arabi:  
The English shall never enter the Canal, never. Make no attempt to 
intercept my Canal. I am there. Not a single English soldier shall 
disembark without being accompanied by a French soldier. I 
answer for everything.96
 
Arabi responded by conveying his thanks to de Lesseps, but insisting that the defense of 
Egypt required the destruction of the canal.97 By August the British controlled the canal 
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and the British army destroyed the forces of Arabi on September 13 at the battle of Tel 
el-Kebir.98 As a result, the British controlled Egypt and exiled Arabi to Sri Lanka. The 
canal was preserved and Egypt stabilized, but what was the real cause for the 
intervention? 
 Historian Charles Hallberg noted, “it was the canal that furnished the pretext for 
intervening in Egypt and it was because of the canal that British troops remained.”99 The 
supposed reasons of restoring Khedival authority and the Alexandria fortifications 
presumably formed viable reasons for the intervention, but this was not the case. The 
forts were a concocted threat at best and were little likely to do any serious damage to the 
British fleet; in fact, British guns caused most of the damage to the city of Alexandria.100  
Britain feared that the Arabi revolt could spark a similar revolt among their Muslim 
subjects. Further, British troops were already heading towards the canal on June 20, prior 
to the actual commencement of hostilities.101 The British could not gamble with security 
of the routes to the east.102 The downfall of Khedival government was not a likely 
impetus to force the anti-jingoistic Gladstone Government to intervene. The danger to the 
canal allowed for Hartington, the Secretary of State for India, and similar minded 
ministers to seize Cabinet control and protect what they deemed a vital interest.103 Britain 
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professed to be acting in the interests of the Concert of Europe, but Britain was more 
interested in her own security. Gladstone admitted the true reason for the intervention in a 
letter to Lord Ripon, the Viceroy of India: 
Apart from the canal we have no interest in Egypt itself which could 
warrant intervention in my opinion. But the safety of the canal will not 
coexist with illegality and military violence in Egypt and I doubt whether 
Parliament and the nation would have sanctioned, as they almost 
universally sanctioned, our proceedings except for the canal.104
 
The canal had assumed an importance far exceeding that accompanying the 1875 share 
purchase. The fact that the Liberal Gladstone Government was willing to intervene in 
Egypt for no reason other than the canal suggests the British imperial attachment to the 
canal. Gladstone’s Government viewed the canal as the linchpin of the empire, the 
stepping stone to India, and a great boon to trade. The fact that the canal was an interest 
no government would gamble with demonstrated the extent to which the canal had 
entered the imperial mind. The British viewed the canal as an imperial necessity. The 
power of the empire came from India and the British ability to protect and defend India. 
Britain had sent troops to Egypt and professed that they would only stay until order was 
restored. They stayed until 1956. While the British Government touted their desire to 
prevent French domination and Muslim insurgencies in other areas of the empire, the 
truth was that the canal was the driving force behind Gladstone’s intervention in Egypt. 
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His actions assured the safety of the canal. As the turn of the century approached, other 
states pressed Britain on the issue of the canal. 
 The British occupation of Egypt created several unintended consequences despite 
the profession that it was a temporary occupation. Cromer believed that the bankruptcy 
and anarchy in Egypt left intervention the only answer.105 However, in a few years he 
believed that reconstructed Egypt was a brighter jewel in the imperial crown than 
India.106 The occupation yielded two consequences for the canal. First, Europe 
recognized the British as guardians of the canal.  The British believed themselves to be 
exercising the Egyptian duty of guarding the canal for the simple fact that they were there 
and the Khedive had invited them to intervene. Additionally, the British occupation led to 
increased cries for, and a British desire to accommodate, the international status of the 
canal. Other powers wanted guarantees for the free transit of the canal while at the same 
time the British wanted to maintain the ability to intervene to protect the canal. Attempts 
at settling the issue dragged, but in 1888 were settled at Constantinople. 
 On October 29, 1888, Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire signed the 1888 Constantinople 
Convention.107 The most telling article was Article I which read: 
The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open in time of war as 
in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without 
distinction of flag.  
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Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to 
interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace 
The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of 
blockade.108  
 
Article IV reasserted the need for the canal to remain open in war even if the Ottomans 
were one of the belligerents in the conflict, with this statement, the rightful guardians of 
the canal could not even use the right of free passage to their advantage.109 However, a 
loophole existed since Article IX called for the government of Egypt to act as charged 
with the enforcement and execution of the Treaty.110 Article IX allowed for the British to 
have a say in the defense of the canal because of their occupation and because of the 
power they wielded in Egypt, Britain effectively governed Egypt.  By 1890, Egypt was a 
vital linchpin of British Eastern Mediterranean strategy.111 Also, the Ottoman Empire’s 
continued decay necessitated the presence of Britain in Egypt to check Russian advances 
and to preserve the path to India. However, other powers took aim at the British position 
in Egypt. 
 In addition to the signing of the Constantinople Convention, the granting of the 
Baghdad rail concession to Germany took place in 1888.112 The concession proposed the 
opening of a railroad from Central Europe as far as Istanbul. 113 The line was seen as the 
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first stage of a proposed rail line from Berlin to Baghdad. This concession not only 
threatened the British hegemony in the Persian Gulf, but it also threatened to circumvent 
the canal. The overland route potentially made the canal less important and allowed the 
possible transit of a military force to the borders of Persia. The Germans had asserted that 
one of the reasons the proposed rail was to aid the Ottomans in reclaiming control over 
outlying areas and could substantially weaken British dominance of the East and offset 
the canal.114 In Die Baghdadbahn, Paul Rohrbach formulated a clear way to harm the 
British Empire: 
England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe in 
one place-Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean not only the end of her 
dominion over the Suez Canal and her communications with India and the 
Far East, but would probably also entail the loss of her possessions in 
Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammadan power, 
like Turkey, would also imperil England’s hold over her sixty million 
Mohammadan subjects in India … The stronger Turkey becomes the 
greater will be the danger for England, if in a German-English war, 
Turkey should be on the side of Germany. 115  
 
This followed an earlier surmisal of the importance of the Canal by Bismarck, who said 
that the canal, 
Is like the spinal cord which connects the backbone with the brain. The 
Canal is the most important factor in shaping British Foreign Policy and 
its control accounts in no small measure for England’s predominant 
position in world affairs.116   
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By the turn of the century, the Germans challenged British world power and Britain 
found herself without any European allies. The Germans followed a three-fold path 
entailing the construction of a strong navy, the building up of the Ottoman Empire, and 
the use of rail to displace the British power emanating from the Suez Canal. These 
matters came to a head in the 1906 Aqaba incident when a resurgent Ottoman Empire 
occupied the Sinai Peninsula, an Ottoman holding. The British did not accept Turkish 
troops so close to the canal, especially since the strengthened German-Ottoman alliance, 
and sent warships to force the troops to retreat. In this instance, the British undermined 
the authority of the Sultan in Egypt and had asserted their claim for true control of 
Egypt.117  
The Germans and Ottomans were not the only countries which made forays 
against the British domination of the canal in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century. France and Russia were particularly upset with the British occupation 
of Egypt and they felt that the British were supplanting the Ottoman Empire as suzerain 
of Egypt.118 The Italians feared the French threatening Italy from North Africa and sought 
alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance. Italy acquired Eritrea, 
but was repulsed in Abyssinia in 1896.119 Despite the defeat in Abyssinia, the Italian 
acquisition of Eritrea allowed for the Italians to impede Suez traffic if they so chose. 
These developments placed a German allied Italy on the Red Sea Route to India and 
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created a threat to the security of the sea lane to India. The French gained territory in the 
Nile Valley at Fashoda, but were evicted. The forces of Kitchener evicted the French 
force and France was left to ponder the British presence in the Nile Valley. 120 The 
British had also expanded their territory into Sudan after the French invasion at Fashoda 
and the later victory over the Mahdist forces at Omdurman in 1898.121 The victory at 
Omdurman led to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over Sudan and the British 
dominance of the territory for the next half century. The expedition into Sudan and the 
final territory annexation under the Egyptian flag allowed a buffer for Egypt, but the 
Italians gained Tripoli and Cyrenaica in their war with the Ottomans in 1912. Sides took 
shape for a coming conflict. Britain also curried disfavor by denying passage of the canal 
to Spanish warships in 1898 and acted as a guardian of the canal instead a guardian of the 
1888 Convention.122
 The British viewed the coming conflict as a grave threat to their empire and began 
to seek alliances. The first alliance was with Japan in 1902.123 By 1904 the Germans had 
risen to equal or greater power than Britain. The Germans had already professed a 
penchant for a Turkish alliance and the growing naval power of Germany along with the 
Berlin to Baghdad rail generated fears in Britain. Additionally, the European powers were 
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suspicious of Britain in light of her actions during the Spanish American War and the 
possibility of the British closing the canal in times of war. However on April 8, 1904, 
Britain signed an agreement with France that resulted in an alliance between two 
countries. The genesis of the alliance stemmed from the mutual fears of Germany and 
amounted to recognition by France of British control over Egypt and a British recognition 
of French control over Morocco. While the alliance resulted in the end of British isolation 
and the tacit recognition of her dominance in Egypt, it did require more of Britain in 
respect to the canal. Article VI of the Agreement stated: 
In order to ensure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic 
Majesty’s Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the 
Treaty of the 29th October 1888, and that they agree to their being put in 
force. The Free Passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed the execution 
of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article 
VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance. 124
 
Article VIII of the 1888 Convention called for the signatories of the Convention to 
guarantee adherence to the convention and to prevent any developments which interfered 
with canal navigation, in the event of interference of tribunal of signatory powers would 
convene to remedy the situation.125 Essentially, as long as Britain maintained the free 
navigation of the canal, no other European power could challenge her dominance by 
tribunal, as provided by Article VIII of the Convention.126 The British had an ally but had 
forfeited their rights to use the canal as a weapon and instead agreed to abide by the 1888 
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Convention. The benefit aside from the alliance was that France recognized British gains 
in Egypt and this advance was shortly afterwards recognized by Russia, Italy, and 
Austria-Hungary.127 In 1907, the British gained further alliances with the signing of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention settling disagreements in Central Asia, partitioning Persia 
into zones of influence, and allowing for Britain to be allied with her former enemy.128 
The Triple Entente, as it was termed, did not become a solid alliance until the outbreak of 
war; but, for the time being, Britain was safe.129 In the years following the 1882 invasion, 
Britain had suffered threats to her position in Egypt and in the region from France, Italy, 
the Ottoman Empire, and Germany. The British had firm control over Egypt and by the 
outbreak of the First World War the canal had even prevented the Ottomans from 
occupying the adjoining Sinai Peninsula in the 1906 Aqaba incident. The commencement 
of hostilities in 1914 put the canal in greater danger than it had ever been in 1882. 
 By the end of the first phase of attachment to the canal, Britain had demonstrated 
several reasons for its obstinacy on the canal. The canal operated as a great benefit to 
trade and a quick and viable route for Eastern trade. Additionally, the canal offered the 
ability to safeguard the route to India and reinforce India itself and other imperial 
interests. Finally, British policy makers viewed the canal as the linchpin of imperial 
security. Politicians recognized the importance of the canal for defense and the security 
of the empire. If the canal was lost or an effective alternative route possessed by an 
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enemy power, the empire could be at risk and the link between the Home Islands and 
India severed. The canal became linked with Gibraltar as one of the vital outposts 
necessary for imperial defense. For all practical purposes, Britain had cemented its 



















 Chapter III 




 By 1914, the Suez Canal had become part of the British Empire. The British had 
invaded Egypt for the sake of preserving their imperial lifeline and were recognized by 
other European powers as the guardian of the canal, or at least the de facto guardian. 
Britain had also gained alliances with Russia and France and appeared to be on good 
terms with its two traditional rivals. Unfortunately new threats emerged and the German 
incursions into the Middle East through the rail concession and the Italian acquisition of 
African colonies placed two hostile powers on either side of the canal. In particular the 
Italians were a concern to the British since their alliance with Germany and their 
proximity to the Red Sea enabled them to potentially interfere with canal shipping. Also 
the Ottoman Empire had grown increasingly weary of the British infringement upon their 
domains. The British seizure of Egypt and the Sudan drove the Ottomans into alliance 
with Germany. The repercussions of the Aqaba incident of 1906 portrayed the British as 
unlikely to respect the authority of the Sublime Porte and caused the Ottoman 
Government to seek allies. Finally, the British alliance with Russia had rendered a 
peaceful Anglo-Ottoman coexistence near impossible.  When events in Europe came to a 
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boil, uncertainty surrounded the canal and each day brought a greater chance of Britain 
having to fight for the canal.  
 The hostilities and the chain reaction from Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s 
assassination enveloped Europe in a massive war with Britain, Russia, France, Belgium, 
and Serbia arrayed against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Since most of these countries 
possessed overseas colonies, it was only logical that those areas would also become sites 
of conflict. The Ottoman Empire initially stayed out of the war, but the war forced them 
to take a side in 1914. On August 2, 1914 the Ottoman Empire concluded a treaty of 
alliance against Russia with the German Empire and secured a buttress to any Russian 
territorial aggrandizement.1 Two days later the British government purchased two 
Dreadnought battleships they had been building for the Ottoman Government and left the 
Ottoman navy severely weakened.2 The Germans sailed their Mediterranean squadron 
into Ottoman waters, hoisted the Ottoman flag, and were thus commissioned part of the 
Ottoman navy. The Ottomans said the acquisition of the German squadron of a battle 
cruiser and light cruiser were necessary replacements for the ships detained by the 
British.3 On October 29, the Ottoman navy attacked the Russian ports of Odessa, 
Sebastopol, Novorossik, and Feodosia, precipitating a Russian declaration of war on the 
Ottomans on November 1 and a British declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire by 
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November 3.4 Sultan Mehmed V declared a holy war, which was permissible due to his 
status as successor to the Muslim Caliphate, and called upon all Muslim subjects in 
French, Russian, and British territories to rise against their imperial masters.5 The worst 
fears of the British had come to fruition. 
 The Ottoman entry into World War I confirmed British fears and placed the route 
to India in jeopardy. The state of war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire also 
diverted British forces destined for dispatch to the Western front. The fear of a Muslim 
insurgency among British forces and in their imperial holdings generated fears of another 
Great Revolt. The British faced the same dilemma that they faced in 1800, how to defend 
the Home Islands and India in the face of an enemy. In World War I the canal served as a 
conduit for troops from the empire as they embarked to aid the Crown in Europe. Early in 
the war, Winston Churchill of the Admiralty and Minister of War Lord Kitchener 
discussed the necessity of securing the canal so that Indian troops could be dispatched to 
the main theater of combat.6 Prior to the Ottoman entry into the war, the War Office had 
envisaged the canal as a necessary holding to convey imperial troops. The Ottoman entry 
into the war shattered this plan. The Ottoman threat left the canal open to martial activity 
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and also opened the possibility of a Muslim insurgency against the British in India and 
her other eastern possessions.7
 The canal became a theater of war and a line of defense for Britain, as Hallberg 
had foreseen.8 Anglo-Ottoman hostilities necessitated a change in the administration in 
Egypt. Despite the ramifications of the Aqaba incident, Egypt was still technically under 
the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire and this status left the British in an odd situation. 
They could not very well defend Egypt against her rightful controllers and thus the 
British government would have to take steps to remedy the situation.  Also, the British 
perceived the Ottoman war aims to be the taking of Egypt, Western India, Persia, and 
Suez, all of which would greatly weaken the empire if successful.9 The British professed 
a desire to avoid direct responsibility for Egypt and had acted under the Egyptian flag 
since 1882, but due to the outbreak of World War I the British had to make a decision to 
evacuate Egypt or assume direct control. 
 Prior to the Ottoman declaration of war, the British pressured the Egyptian 
government to issue a proclamation pointing out that the British occupation rendered 
Egypt open to attacks from Britain’s enemies and forbade Egyptians from all financial 
and commercial dealings with Britain’s enemies.10 The proclamation also urged 
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Egyptians to offer any possible aid to Great Britain.11 On November 2, 1914, three days 
before the Ottoman declaration of war, Sir John Maxwell, commander of British forces in 
Egypt, proclaimed martial law in Egypt and announced the British assumption of 
Egyptian defense burdens.12 The British suspected many Egyptians of harboring pro-
Ottoman sympathies, after all Britain was the occupying power. The British had to 
choose between two ways of incorporating Egypt into the empire: annex Egypt or declare 
a protectorate.  Since the British were in Egypt for the sake of the canal it made little 
sense to fully incorporate Egypt into the empire, so the protectorate was the most 
advisable option. Additionally, the Khedive had reaffirmed his loyalty to the Sultan and 
quickly saw his office abolished when the British declared the protectorate. On December 
18-19, 1914, the British government formally announced the protectorate, 
His Brittanic Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice 
that in view of the state of war arising out of the actions of Turkey, Egypt 
is placed under the protection of his majesty and will henceforth constitute 
a British Protectorate. The Suzerainty of Turkey is terminated.13
 
The threat to the canal and the benefit it afforded the empire resulted in direct British 
control over Egypt. The British avoided this assumption for years, but when the 
Ottomans threatened the canal through invasion, the British took steps to secure their 
most vital interest in the region. With the canal secured, the British awaited the long 
feared attack on the canal. 
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 During World War I, the canal’s value to the empire would be tested and the 
British Government forced to deploy troops to defend the canal. In January of 1915, 
reports of a twenty thousand man Ottoman force advancing towards the canal thrust the 
Cairo Office into a panic.14 The Cairo Office was the British military and Foreign Office 
Headquarters in the Middle East. The pending attack was also particularly frightening 
since many of the occupation troops had been sent to Europe in August to aid the British 
Expeditionary Force and most regular forces were bound for the Western front.15 The 
War Office adopted a defensive strategy around the canal. The War Office was 
determined to use any available manpower to defend the canal and forbade any further 
troop transfers from the Egyptian garrison.16 As a benefit, the canal served its role as a 
staging area for imperial troops destined for the Western front. By January 1915, 
Territorial troops replacing regular Egyptian garrison forces and troops from India, 
Australia, and New Zealand on their way to the front, a total of seventy thousand troops, 
filled Egypt.17 On the opposing side, the Ottomans prepared an expeditionary force for 
dispatch to Egypt to conquer the canal and the commander in chief of this force, Djemal 
Pasha, was already referring to himself as the “savior of Egypt.”18 The coming attack led 
the British to station a Lancashire Division, two divisions of Indian infantry, and 
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Australasian troops along the canal forming a defensive line, as well as Anglo-French 
naval troops being stationed in the canal.  Turkish patrols opened fire on British posts on 
January 26, 1915.19 The next day, Britain suspended traffic through the canal in 
preparation for the hostilities.20 On February 3, the main Ottoman attack commenced, but 
was spotted before it began by French aerial reconnaissance. A sandstorm and the British 
defense repulsed the attack and only one crossing pontoon was even placed in the water. 
The much ballyhooed attack on the canal was defeated. One more Ottoman assault 
occurred in June and July of 1916 and was also easily repulsed.21 These attacks 
confirmed to the British the need to maintain a large British garrison in Egypt. Minister 
of War Kitchener pronounced the defensive strategy of the canal as doomed to failure and 
wanted the Ottoman Empire toppled so troops could be sent to the Western Front.22 
Kitchener believed that keeping a large number of troops in Egypt for defensive purposes 
was hampering the main war effort in Europe and wanted the Middle Eastern Campaign 
won as soon as possible. With the repulse of the July Ottoman attack, the canal was safe 
and the area became a starting point for Lawrence and Allenby. The security of the canal 
allowed the empire to focus on toppling the Ottoman Empire.  In 1917, the Indian army 
overcame stubborn Ottoman resistance and captured Baghdad.23  Allenby took control of 
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) and was determined to break the stalemate that 
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existed around Gaza. The Ottoman forces along with some German units had established 
a defensive line around Gaza and used it as a last stand to prevent the British from 
entering into the heartland of the Ottoman Empire.24 Employing a massive artillery 
bombardment and a gallant cavalry charge by the Australian Light Horse, the EEF 
overtook Gaza and forced an Ottoman retreat.25 Jerusalem fell on December 9 and 
Allenby, flanked by allied officers, walked into Jerusalem on foot to accept the surrender 
of the city, as British troops occupied the Holy Lands.26 The EEF under Allenby broke 
Turkish resistance at Megiddo on September 19-21, 1918 and on October 30 the Ottoman 
Government signed an armistice on the island of Lemnos.27 The imagery of the British 
forces winning a triumphal victory at the site of the first battle and the prophesized site of 
Armageddon served to enamor the British public. However, Allenby was not the most 
celebrated of the British commanders. That title fell to T.E. Lawrence, better known as 
Lawrence of Arabia. 
 Lawrence was a member of the Arab Bureau and had been sent to the Arabian 
Peninsula to find a leader to lead the Arabs to victory over the Ottomans.28 The Arab 
Bureau was an organization of Middle East experts organized by the Foreign Office. The 
Arab Bureau had three critical objectives: “protect the imperial trunk routes to India, 
mollify anticipated upsurge in Arab demands for self-government through the medium of 
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British sponsored client state, and obviate the burden of postwar annexation and/or 
occupation.”29 The Bureau wanted to raise an Arab insurrection to aid the British attacks 
on the Ottoman Empire and to siphon off Ottoman troops. The main accomplishment of 
the Arab Revolt, in which Lawrence played a great role, was the seizure of Aqaba. 
Lawrence remarked that it was his destiny to take part in the revolt and the conquest of 
Aqaba.30 The rationale for this seizure was Aqaba’s presence on the eastern side of the 
Red Sea and the ability control of Aqaba offered the Ottomans to close the route to 
Suez.31 The revolt consisted of guerrilla raids by Bedouins loyal to the Hashemite clan. 
Lawrence wanted to make the Arab revolt an engine to his own success, a handmaid to 
the British Egyptian campaign, and to lead this revolt.32 Lawrence and his forces harassed 
the Ottoman armies as Allenby advanced into Palestine. While Allenby gained victory 
over the Ottomans, witnessed his troops dispatched to Europe, and awaited Indian 
reinforcements, Lawrence and Feisal marched on Damascus and proclaimed an Arab 
government. Feisal was the son of Sharif Husayn of the Hijaz and the leader of Arab 
army; he would later become king of Iraq. The taking of Damascus was in opposition to 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was a 1916 agreement dividing the Middle East 
between Britain and France, and eventually nullified since Syria was promised to France 
under Sykes-Picot. While the Arab Revolt accomplished little in terms of the overall 
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military success of the Middle East Campaign, the adventures of Lawrence served to 
captivate the British public and make Lawrence a celebrity. 
 World War I served to further entrench the canal in the imperial mind. First, the 
canal was the starting point for the only wholly British victory of the war. The victorious 
British troops began the campaign defending the Suez Canal and started their campaign 
from the canal area. They won the Middle East campaign with no help from their allies in 
contrast to the Western Front. Additionally, the victorious forces in this campaign 
represented all parts of the empire. Britons, Indians, New Zealanders, and Australians 
defended the canal. The victories of Lawrence, though embellished to great degree by 
Lawrence himself, and Allenby were launched from the canal. Especially coming on the 
heels of Gallipoli in 1915-16, the victories restored faith in the British military and were 
characterized by a more fluid style of war. The cavalry charge at Gaza, the raids of 
Lawrence, and the biblical imagery of Jerusalem, Megiddo, and Allenby’s marching into 
Jerusalem on foot, distracted from the harsh trench warfare of the Western front. Finally, 
the canal had been fought for by British troops and lives had been lost defending the 
canal against Ottoman attacks. If nothing more, it was now a spoil of war and controlled 
by the British.  
 The end of World War I brought murkiness to the position of the Suez Canal in 
the imperial mind and strategy. Despite its appeal, the priority for the canal route had 
diminished due to the wartime reliance on the Cape Route. Political Scientist Sir 
Frederick Maurice stated in a Foreign Affairs article in the aftermath of the war that the 
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“canal was not vital to the empire.”33  The canal’s importance shifted from dire 
importance, and Suez temporarily moved towards being a holding of lesser substance. 
During the war, the British used the Cape Route for shipping since the canal was subject 
to mines and German U-Boats roamed the neighboring waters. Beginning in 1915, the 
Germans concentrated their submarines in the Mediterranean and sank numerous British 
ships, including fifty six in April 1917.34Also, Continental matters did not hamper the 
Cape Route and it was less likely to become a combat zone during a European conflict. 
The British possession of the majority of Southern Africa and the eviction of the 
Germans from their African colonies added a greater level of safety to the Cape Route. 
Eventually, the Suez Canal was reopened and convoys allowed for the secure escort of 
trading ships.35 Additionally the relative ease with which the British repelled the attacks 
on the canal presumably led to some in Britain to disdain the large garrison situated at the 
canal. The rationale is the disparity between combat near the canal and combat along the 
Western Front. With few casualties in the Middle East compared to the exorbitant 
numbers in Europe, many Englishmen questioned the logic of posting such a large 
garrison in Egypt. Additionally, the supposed mismanagement of strategy fit in with the 
views of the “lost generation.” While these attitudes occurred at the end of the war, they 
proved fleeting, similar to the temporary apathy that existed after the initial share 
purchase by Disraeli. 
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 The conclusion of the war changed the British understanding of the canal and 
ushered in a renewed period of heightened importance of the canal. The rationale 
stemmed from two main areas: postwar settlements and Egyptian independence. The 
postwar settlement allowed for self-determination for many former imperial holdings. 
But the victors, due to Egypt’s protectorate status, denied a seat at the peace talks held at 
Versailles to the Egyptians. The British obtained the legal right to safeguard the canal 
through a series of agreements with the Egyptians and the most important being the 
Turkish forfeiture of the guardianship of the canal to Britain at the Treaty of Sevres. 
Section IX of the Treaty of Sevres stated 
Turkey renounces in favor of Great Britain, the powers conferred upon his 
Imperial majesty the Sultan by the convention signed at Constantinople on 
October 21, 1888 relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal.36   
 
The British were officially recognized as the guardian of the canal and given the task of 
upholding the free navigation of the canal. The British status as guardians of the canal 
was affirmed in Article 152 of the Treaty of Versailles where 
Germany consents in so far as she is concerned to the transfer to His 
Brittanic Majesty’s Government of the powers conferred to His Imperial 
Majesty the Sultan by the Convention37
 
These sentiments were furthered referred to in peace treaties with Austria (Article 107 of 
the Treaty of St.Germain), Hungary (Article 91 of the Treaty of Trianon) and Turkey 
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(Article 99 of the Treaty of Lausanne).38 The Treaty of Lausanne was signed between the 
allies and the newly proclaimed Turkish republic, which formed after the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire. 
 Immediately after the end of the First World War, the Egyptians began their move 
for independence and the renunciation of the British Protectorate, but the British were 
reluctant to relinquish a strategic holding that was described by Lord Milner as “a nodal 
point of land, sea, and air communication.”39  The Wafd party led by Saad Zaghul 
claimed it represented Egypt and desired to form a government, a desire which was not 
reciprocated by the British Government in Cairo. The Wafd party was formed by 
members of the landed gentry and legal profession in Egypt and its express goal was the 
independence of Egypt.40 The British arrested Zaghul and his associates on March 8, 
1919 and rioting began in Lower Egypt, at one point compelling British troops to open 
fire.41 Disturbances spread and eight British soldiers were murdered by Egyptians in a 
railway carriage at Deirut Station on March 18.42 The British Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George appointed Allenby High Commissioner in an effort to restore order and maintain 
the Protectorate. Allenby sympathized with the Egyptian people and ordered the release 
of the Wafd detainees. Towards the end of 1919, Egyptians murdered more British 
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soldiers and some Egyptians were targeted as well.43 As the situation in Egypt worsened, 
Allenby traveled to London to convince the Cabinet of the need to end the Protectorate. 
In February 1922, Allenby made the announcement granting Egypt independence for the 
first time in two thousand years. The Protectorate was abolished and Egypt made 
independent, but there were some conditions implied in the recognition. The declaration 
which put an end to the protectorate read as follows: 
Whereas His Majesty’s Government, in accordance with their declared 
intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent 
sovereign State; and whereas the relations between his Majesty’s 
Government and Egypt are of vital importance to the British Empire, the 
following principles are hereby declared 
1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated and Egypt is 
declared to be a sovereign state 
2. As soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of 
Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, Martial 
Law, as proclaimed on 2 November 1914 shall be withdrawn. 
3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion 
of His Majesty’s Government until such time as it may be possible 
by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to 
conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty’s 
Government of Egypt: 
  (a) The security of the communications of the British 
Empire in Egypt 
 (b)The defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or 
interference, direct or indirect 
 (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the 
protection of minorities 
(d) The Sudan.44
 
While the Egyptians governed themselves, the British maintained what could best be 
termed suzerainty over Egypt and the four points of reservation allowed a heavy British 
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hand in Egypt. The first point referencing the security of imperial communications is 
clear reference to the canal and when coupled with the second point of protection from 
foreign aggression, cemented the ability of Britain to maintain troops and act in defense 
of the canal in Egypt. The British gave up the burden of governing Egypt, but they still 
held on to their right to defend the canal and wield considerable influence in Egypt. The 
third point also referred to foreign interests and extraterritoriality in Egypt, with the canal 
as one the largest interests. Since multiple countries needed the canal to remain open, the 
British still upheld the 1888 Convention. Essentially, the granting of Egyptian 
independence saw Britain cut all of her administrative ties to Egypt except those 
pertaining to her role as canal guardian. 
 The reserved points formed a constant bone of contention between the Wafdists 
and successive British Governments. In 1924 the Labour Government, led by Ramsay 
MacDonald, came to power and the new Prime Minister met with Saad Zaghul in the 
autumn of that year. Zaghul made five demands aimed at evicting Britain from Egypt, the 
most taxing being the demand for Britain to renounce all claims and rights to the Suez 
Canal.45 Commons debated Zaghul’s demands. The first issue of concern raised by 
MacDonald was the canal, and he summed up British policy by stating,  
I raised the question of the Suez Canal straight away because its security is 
of vital interest to us both in peace and war. It is no less true today than in 
1922 that the security of the communications of the British Empire in 
Egypt renders a vital British interest and the absolute certainty that the 
Suez Canal remain open in peace as well as in war for the free passage of 
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British ships is the foundation on which the entire defense policy of the 
British Empire rests.46
 
If any doubt existed to the importance of the Suez Canal to British defense policy, 
MacDonald laid those fears to rest. MacDonald referred to the failure of the 1888 
Convention and the internationalization of the canal to provide for free transit in World 
War I. He reminded Commons that Britain was forced to take steps to maintain the free 
passage of the canal and that no British Government would allow the closure of the 
canal.47 Macdonald reaffirmed the British policy of no British Government allowing the 
closure of the canal, which was also uttered during the 1882 crisis. A January 24, 1927 
letter from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Austen Chamberlain to Egyptian High 
Commissioner Lord Lloyd conveyed similar sentiments by saying “the protection of the 
Suez Canal was considered of such vital importance to Great Britain that she was 
unwilling under any circumstances to entrust this to the Egyptian government alone.”48 In 
the same debate as MacDonald’s speech, F.C. Thomson, a member of Parliament in 
1922,  stated “it does not seem to me that there could be any interest more vital to the 
British Empire than the preservation of our communications through the Suez Canal.”49 
These reserved points hindered Egypt until 1936, when the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
of Alliance resolved the issue. The canal was of dire importance to the British Empire at 
this point in time. The canal’s role as a communications nodal point was still apparent 
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and the British were so adamant on keeping the canal open to shipping that they would 
not allow any other group to administer it. British granting of Egyptian independence was 
dependant upon the British exercising their role as canal guardians.  
 At the conclusion of the multitude of peace conferences and settlements following 
World War I, Britain had acquired several territories and mandates in the Middle East 
including Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine.50 These new possessions served to deepen 
British attachment to the region and placed the canal as the centerpiece of the new 
empire. The canal occupied a role as the gateway to the exotic lands of the east and 
author E.M. Forster thought “somewhere about Suez there is always a social change, the 
arrangements of Asia weaken and those of Europe begin to be felt.”51 During the interwar 
period, the debate over independence for India began to arise and the former romantic 
realm made famous by Kipling waned. However, the Middle East offered a vestige of the 
old imperial might where Britain could still make kings. Also a similarity existed in the 
new Middle East holdings that paralleled the old way of rule in India. As historian David 
Cannadine observed, “the Arab emirs and sheikhs seemed like the Indian princes and 
Nigerian emirs, only more so noble and superior leaders, the patrons and protectors of a 
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traditional ordered world, which once existed but was now under serious threat.”52 While 
India was still the most important imperial holding, the social structure and British power 
in India were diminishing. Essentially, the Middle East offered a new place for the British 
to rule absolutely, while they still maintained India and attempted to alter their rule to 
maintain their control. The old romantic imagery of Britain ruling supreme over exotic 
lands in India was in danger of being eradicated, but the lands of the mandates offered a 
replacement. Cannadine continued, “the growing attachment to the Arab World, by turn 
patrician, romantic, and escapist, coincided with the gradual extension of British power 
into the Middle East.”53 British dominance over states formed under their auspices and 
the influence they wielded over the monarchs of these lands allowed for a sense of 
traditional empire. After all, the Middle East was the land of Lawrence and his 
adventures, which were growing ever popular with the publication of his books and the 
traveling lecture tour. The British created kings in these regions and did so under the 
condition these loyal monarchs accept their advice and preserve imperial 
communications.54 These new possessions allowed for the preservation of the canal, 
ensured the security of the canal with the buffer of Palestine, and completed an overland 
communications and air route to India through Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. 
The security benefits for Britain were immense and the British ability to make rulers 
along the lines of those in the Indian Princely State rendered the Middle East a substitute 
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India.55 The canal formed the key to these lands and the tales of the adventures of 
Lawrence and later adventures of Glubb. The canal was the centerpiece of the new 
empire in the Middle East. 
 After the 1920s, the canal dropped in importance based on regional issues, the 
dominant spirit of peace stemming from Locarno, the Washington Naval Conference, and 
Kellogg-Briand, a pacifist British public, and the changing world order. The 1928 
Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed by virtually all states, who agreed to refrain from 
military action as a way to settle international disputes.56 The Treaty of Locarno was the 
settling of Germany’s western borders.57 Locarno also was an agreement among the 
major powers of Europe to settle conflict through peaceful means. The Washington Naval 
Conference took place from 1921 to 1922 and placed proportional limits on the naval 
strength of the world navies.58 The conference was hailed by United States Secretary for 
State Frank Kellogg as a great step towards peace.59 The result of these three treaties was 
the birth of the spirit of Locarno, essentially a sense of the end of the age of war. Though 
at the end of the First World War the canal had emerged as the swing door of the empire 
and the vital lifeline without which the empire could not stand, this shifted in the 1930s 
as the empire began to question its own power. The swing door distinction derived from 
both economic and political concerns. Economically, the canal allowed for the continued 
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flow of trade between Britain and her empire. Politically, the canal allowed for a linkage 
of the empire and the ready dispatch of British or Indian troops to defend the empire. The 
British army decreased in size during this period of time. The fallout of World War I and 
the emergence of the so called “lost generation” left many Britons unwilling to support 
any martial activity.60 The army became stigmatized and beset by “a pacifist electorate, a 
parsimonious treasury, and uncertainty over its role.”61 The War Ministry was unpopular 
with the British public and the officer ranks rife with resignations.62 The focus on air 
defenses left the British army in disrepair and presumably unable to maintain the defense 
of the empire.63 The British Government placed their faith in the Air Ministry defending 
the empire and ignored the army, which had suffered so much during the last conflict. 
The government also adopted the Cardwell system which advocated equal forces to be 
allotted for home and imperial defense leaving the majority of the army stationed in 
Britain or in India.64 For example the British stationed forty-five battalions in India and 
only six in Egypt. The gateway to India and the canal, which had been the scene of two 
British military activities, became expendable.65 The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the spirit 
of Locarno mesmerized the British Government and British ministers believed that no 
future war would occur. It ordered the military on the Ten Year Rule, calling for the 
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armed forces of the empire not to prepare for war for ten years.66 While the Ten Year 
Rule was also a cost cutting measure, the willingness of the Government in disallowing 
military preparation meant that in any future conflict, the British lagged behind countries 
that had maintained military preparations. In terms of the Middle East, the British 
Government left only minimal detachments of the army, presumably only enough to 
subvert any local rising. The reason for the troop reduction in the Middle East was 
described by historian Elizabeth Monroe, “Britain remained paramount in the Middle 
East, unchallenged by any power of equal magnitude and able to maintain order thanks to 
the security and aura of empire and its ability to summon reinforcements from India and 
Malta in time of need.”67 Monroe believed that there was no need for more troops in the 
Middle East at this time. At the end of this redeployment, one cavalry brigade, one tank 
brigade, and one infantry brigade defended the canal and Egypt, a far cry from the 
seventy thousand men of the EEF who defended the canal during World War I. 
 Developments in Iraq and Egypt led to some indecision with regards to the canal. 
The weakness stemmed from the perceived weakness of Britain in the region due to 
treaty concessions during the 1930s. Iraq had become a vital imperial center for fly over 
purposes and it was a chain in the Indian shield that began at Suez. In 1930, the British 
signed a treaty of alliance granting Iraqi independence and severely restricting their 
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military presence in Iraq.68 The treaty allowed the Royal Air Force to retain four bases 
and the British assured responsibility for the defense of Iraq. The British created a pliant 
monarchy for the sake of preserving imperial communications.69 The treaty with Iraq was 
followed shortly by renewed negotiations with Egypt.  The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
of Alliance settled the point of reservation included in the 1922 Declaration. The treaty 
replaced the British military occupation with an alliance and called for the termination of 
the British military presence in Egypt.70 Article VIII preserved the canal stating: 
In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, while being an integral part of 
Egypt, is a universal means of communication between the different parts 
of the British Empire, His Majesty the King of Egypt, until such time as 
the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position 
to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of the 
navigation of the Canal, authorizes His Majesty the King and Emperor to 
stations forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal, in a zone 
specified in the annex to this Article, with a view to ensuring in co-
operation with the Egyptian forces the defense of the Canal.71
 
Article VIII also created the Canal Zone, which was to be controlled and administered by 
Britain and would become one of the largest military bases in the world. The Annex 
allowed for a twenty-year period of British occupation before the Egyptians took full 
control of the defense of the canal and read: 
It is understood that at the end of the period of twenty years specified in 
Article 16 the question whether the presence of British forces is no longer 
necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian army is in a position to 
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ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of 
the Canal may, if the High Contracting Parties do not agree thereon, be 
submitted to the council of the League of Nations for decision in 
accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of the 
signature of the present treaty or to such other persons for decision in 
accordance with such other procedures as the High Contracting Parties 
may agree.72
 
 While the British ended a costly military occupation, they managed to maintain their 
presence in the canal area and to defend it for twenty more years. The interesting 
development is Britain’s willingness to part with the occupation of Egypt and supposed 
consideration of entrusting Egypt with the defense of the canal in the future. The 
rationale stretched a long distance from the attitude of the MacDonald Government, but 
the treaty agreements regarding the canal were most likely an attempt to stall a handover 
for the foreseeable future. The reason was that Britain was still weakened from World 
War I, suffering monetary issues, disinclined to martial activity, and most importantly, a 
larger issue in the world loomed: fascism. 
 In the early 1930s, the threats to the British Empire came from two sources: Japan 
and Italy. During World War I, Japan was a British ally and acted to protect British 
interests in the Far East; but, times had changed. By the 1930s, the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance was terminated and Japan was now ruled by a military government. The British 
desired to pursue closer ties with the Americans and allowed the military alliance with 
Japan to lapse in the 1920s.73 A cooperative agreement between the United States, 
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Britain, Japan, and France replaced the naval treaty between Japan and Britain.74 This 
suspicion of Japanese hostility led to considerations of the eastern holdings. The 
Washington Naval Conference limited the size of the Japanese navy, but left the Japanese 
the dominant naval power in the Pacific.75 Japan also felt slighted by the proportions se at 
the conference and the British termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.76 British 
policy makers decided to use Singapore as the forward base in the Far East and in time of 
trouble to dispatch half of the main fleet to the Far East.77 Italy was not considered a 
threat and it was not believed that the British could defend the Home Islands, Egypt, and 
the Far East simultaneously. The Italian incursions into Abyssinia threatened the British 
position in the region and placed the canal in danger. While Britain allowed Italian troop 
movements through the canal, there was the possibility of these transports disembarking 
their troops and claiming the canal. The conquest of Abyssinia further entrenched Italy on 
either side of the canal, when coupled with her control of Libya. The British had the 
opportunity to prevent the Italian invasion by closing the canal to their warships, but the 
British chose not to and wished to avoid fighting the Italian army. The British fear of the 
Italians demonstrated the diminution of British martial strength, effect of the spirit of 
Locarno after World War I, and the folly of the Ten Year Rule. The threat of the Italians 
led the British to undertake the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which 
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generated a benefit in the forcing of the Egyptians to acknowledge the vital role of the 
canal for imperial communications and the granting of RAF flyover rights. The British 
assumed that no power would challenge their hold over the Middle East and they 
concentrated on the Japanese threat to their eastern holdings.  The dispute between the 
RAF and Admiralty had led to the defenses on Malta becoming neglected and the British 
proved unprepared to deal with a Mediterranean threat.78 The RAF and Admiralty 
believed their respective branches were best suited for defense in coming conflicts. The 
Chamberlain Government even contemplated withdrawal from the region to avoid 
conflict.79 The 1937 Imperial Conference called for the Far East to be the priority for 
imperial defense and advocated a doctrine of self-sufficiency for the defense of Egypt.80 
Self-sufficiency required the three brigades in Egypt to hold out as long as possible 
against any invasion and to await reinforcements.81 While a rapprochement was pursued 
with Italy, the canal was relegated by policy makers to less important than the Singapore 
base and only allotted three divisions for defense. The rapprochement allowed a sense of 
Mediterranean security and gave British planners time to focus on the defense of the Far 
East. 
 Some British statesmen called for the Government to sacrifice the Mediterranean 
due to the disrepair of the British Navy and the need to defend India. Foreign Minister 
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Anthony Eden believed that the Mediterranean could be lost and later regained if 
necessary.82  In years past when the threats came from Europe the canal had been the 
security of India; with the increased perception of the Japanese threat, Singapore proved 
the key. The Committee of Imperial Defense so preoccupied itself with a three front war 
that they postulated a plan to have the French Navy guard the canal.83 Circumstances in 
1938 necessitated another shift in canal importance as it became more and more likely 
that Italy would be a likely opponent of Britain in any future war. Italian involvement in 
the Spanish Civil War, Italian rearmament, and the increase of the garrison in Abyssinia 
worried London and foreshadowed Italian aggression.84 British policy makers believed 
that the control of the canal allowed Britain to sever the Italian communications to her 
East African colonies and to secure Alexandria, which would be the main British base in 
any conflict.85 Also in any future conflict, the powerful Indian army would be needed to 
aid the war effort. In 1938 reinforcements began to be dispatched to Egypt and were 
agreed to by Egyptian Government, which had grown fearful of the increased troop 
Italian deployments to Libya. The Admiralty dispatched the Mediterranean fleet to 
Alexandria.86 The British had flip-flopped for a few years over the importance of the 
canal versus that of Singapore; but, as the Second World War approached, the canal 
regained its place as a necessary holding for the British Empire. The reasons for the 
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vacillation stemmed from the multiple threats facing the empire. When Japan appeared 
the most likely enemy, Singapore received priority at the expense of canal defense. Also, 
the vacillation stemmed from a limited amount of money and supplies, resulting in 
whichever base was threatened, be it Suez or Singapore, received troops and support. But 
when the canal was threatened, the pendulum swung back to defense of the canal as 
primary.  
 In 1939, Winston Churchill proclaimed the Mediterranean England’s first 
battlefield and the Egyptian Government asked for even more British troops to be 
dispatched. 87 The British Government decided that despite some initial trepidation over 
the ability to hold Egypt during a war, the canal had to be held and the Mediterranean 
won.  The detriment was that for this strategy to work the United States had to use their 
fleet to check the Japanese fleet in the Pacific and the Franklin Roosevelt Administration 
was more willing to preserve their isolationist stance than to actually aid against Japan.88 
While this strategy failed, the British had committed themselves to preserving Egypt. 
However, in the event of conflict with Italy, Egypt was the jumping off point from which 
Britain could attack Libya and Abyssinia and strangle Italian communications and 
colonies. The 1939 St. James Conference stressed the importance of Egypt as a hub of 
communications and it was grouped as one of the three most important holdings in the 
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region.89 In 1939, Britain strengthened its air defenses around the canal in 1939 and the 
British prepared for another defense of the canal against a European enemy. While the 
initial strategic planning had painted the canal as expendable in favor of Singapore, the 
realization of a European conflict left Britain with no choice but to defend the canal. Such 
a defense sought to prevent any incursion against Egypt or their position in the Middle 
East. The problem was that the Ten Year Rule and Cardwell system had weakened the 
British military and left it unprepared for war. 
 The Second World War once again saw the return of hostilities to Egypt and 
rekindled the omnipresent fear of an attack on the canal. The Churchill Government 
decided to make a stand in the Mediterranean and forsake their earlier plans to dispatch 
the fleet to Singapore.90 Early British experience in the war showed the lingering effects 
of the Ten Year rule and saw the British Expeditionary Force swept from the Continent 
saved only by the miracle of Dunkirk.91 While the Germans overran British resistance in 
Europe, the Italians declared war on June 10, 1940. Their declaration implied attacks 
against Suez and Gibraltar.92 The British responded by refusing canal entry to the ships of 
both Germany and Italy.93 The British forces in the canal placed guards at the two entry 
points to the canal and stopped all ships from entering the canal without security 
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clearances. British commanders in Egypt clamored for anti-aircraft batteries.94 The Italian 
air force mounted some air attacks on the canal, but the inaccurate Italian bombing 
resulted in little damage. Additionally; the troop buildups in the Italian African colonies 
suggested a land attack. The British stopped the Italian naval threat on November 11-12, 
1940 when the Royal Navy sank three Italian battleships in their moorings and confirmed 
the British dominance of the naval portion of the Mediterranean theater.95 While the canal 
may have been temporarily secured, it was feared that the main attack on the canal would 
come from the land as in World War I.  
 The land portion of the North African Campaign would be decided along the 
borders between Libya and Egypt. The Italians had stationed over 215,000 troops in 
Libya, and they confronted fifty thousand British troops in Egypt.96 Campaigning in 
North Africa took the form of a shoving match with the Axis attempting to push their 
way into Egypt in an effort to take the canal with the British impeding their efforts and 
attempting to push the Axis out of North Africa. The Italians mentioned reclaiming the 
Roman Empire and the War Cabinet became determined to defend Egypt and sent the 
best available armor to Egypt.97 Notably the Churchill Government made this decision 
during the height of the Battle of Britain and heightened the importance of Egypt and the 
canal. The Italian advance on Egypt began in the summer of 1940 and the British Long 
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Range Desert patrol harassed their advance.98 Churchill lobbied for more troops to be 
dispatched to Egypt and troops from all over the empire began to arrive. Once again the 
canal was the conduit for imperial troops to rally to the crown and defend the artery of 
the empire.99 In 1940, Churchill wrote to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and 
Australia informing them of the decision to keep the fleet at Alexandria and called on 
India and Australasia to dispatch any available troops to Egypt. At the same time as the 
British fleet defeated the Italians, the British forces in Egypt pushed the Italian army back 
to Tobruk and were on the verge of claiming victory in the region.100 The British had 
staved off defeat in Europe and secured the canal through their victories in Egypt. 
Churchill commented. “by the end of that year this small and ancient island, with its 
devoted Commonwealth, Dominions, and attachments under every sky had proved itself 
capable of bearing the whole impact and weight of world destiny.”101 Defeating the 
Italians in North Africa was a temporary reason for self-congratulation, but then the 
Germans got involved in the campaign. 
 On September 6, 1940, Admiral Raeder of the German Navy suggested to Hitler 
of the need to take the canal before United States aid arrived and Hitler resolved to drive 
the British from the canal. 102 Yet again, a British enemy had decided that the best way to 
hamper the empire was to take the canal. On January 18-19, 1941, the Luftwaffe attacked 
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installations along the canal and dropped mines into the canal.103 The presence of mines 
resulted in repeated closures of the canal and the British dispatched all available mine 
clearing equipment to the canal.104 Additionally, the shipping problems caused by 
German air attacks delayed the arrival of anti-aircraft equipment and that equipment did 
not arrive until spring, rendering the canal vulnerable to German attacks. Germany had 
initially intended to send troops to aid the Italian war effort, but reassigned them to 
Greece in October of 1940.105 The AfrikaKorps arrived in February of 1941 and the 
general who led the troops was the most feared German commander of the war: Erwin 
Rommel.106 Rommel’s forces began to regain ground lost by the Italians and forced the 
British forces to retreat over three hundred miles.107 Rommel defeated the British forces 
and captured the vital fuel depot/port of Tobruk, thereby infuriating Churchill.108 The fall 
of Torbuk was the second largest British capitulation of the war and 35,000 British 
prisoners were taken.109 Upon hearing of the fall of Tobruk, Churchill remarked, “defeat 
is one thing, disgrace is another.”110The Germans were getting dangerously close to the 
canal. Something had to be done by the British. 
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 Churchill decided to make Bernard Montgomery commander of the British Eighth 
Army and he hoped that Montgomery could find a way to stunt the German advance. 
Montgomery began to make a myth for himself starting with his appointment. As 
Montgomery was walking to the plane to take him to Egypt, he spoke of a great general 
who won many victories only to be defeated in the desert. At this statement, his aide 
reassured of him of his chances versus Rommel, and Montgomery responded that he had 
been talking about Rommel.111 Montgomery took control and began preparations for a 
showdown with Rommel. He refused Churchill’s call for a September offensive because 
he did not want to fight until he was ready. In August of 1942, Britain prepared Cairo for 
street to street fighting and the British Army issued rifles to civil servants, few hoped of 
stopping Rommel.112 But Montgomery had hope and benefited from the Royal Air 
Force’s sinking of Axis shipping to North Africa.113 The lack of supplies bought vital 
time for Montgomery to supply and train. 
 In late October and early November, the Battle of Alamein commenced with the 
Germans attacking the Eighth Army and the Eighth stopping their advance once and for 
all. The battle was a triumph for the Eighth Army, composed of men from Britain, India, 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The British beat back the supposedly 
invincible Afrikakorps and the Eighth began to push the Axis forces westward towards 
Tunisia. By January 1943, the British entered Tripoli and the North African theater was 
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won. The victory at Alamein proved a triumph of tactics and the use of the superior 
manpower of the Eighth Army.114 At Tripoli, Churchill addressed the men of the British 
Eighth Army saying, “ever since your victory at Alamein, you have nightly pitched your 
moving tents a day’s march nearer home. In days to come when people ask what you did 
in the Second World War, it will be enough to say: I marched with the Eighth Army.”115 
By the end of 1943, the British evicted the Axis from North Africa and the canal was safe 
because as Montgomery stated, “the Eighth Army never withdraws.”116  The battle of 
Alamein was the beginning of the end for the German war effort and began a series of 
Allied victories. As Churchill noted, “before Alamein we never had a victory, after 
Alamein we never had a defeat.”117
The end of World War II also brought about a momentous shift in the world 
political spectrum. Britain perceived itself to have borne the brunt of a German attack and 
was, along with the rest of Europe, in need of rebuilding. Fascism was defeated and 
Germany divided, but the end of the war also left the world torn between the two 
superpowers: the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Cold 
War became an event filled with diplomatic intrigue and proxy wars where each side 
claimed regions of the world for their influence. And the Cold War confronted Britain 
with a decision to make. They could make a claim to being a world power; after all, the 
empire was still intact and the British were one of the victorious allies in the war. 
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However, Britain was not in any economic or political state to compete with the two 
other powers. Additionally, the forces of nationalism and calls for decolonization became 
overwhelming as many parts of the empire called for independence, most notably India in 
1947. The only region under firm British control was the Middle East and the British 
controlled the region to safeguard of the route to India and to defend the canal. The canal 
remained under British control as the Cold War began and the Middle East took on 
renewed importance in the geopolitical contest. Britain attempted to define its role in the 
Cold War and still laid claim to dominance in the Middle East. The British viewed their 
role as holding the Middle East against the forces of communism. The most important 
holding in the Middle East was the canal.  Ironically the canal sparked the events that led 












Chapter IV  
Parting Ways with the Canal: Postwar British Policy and the Struggle with Nasser 
 
 
 The British emerged among the victorious in World War II and as the dominant 
power in the Middle East.  Though weakened by war, the British Empire had survived its 
most dire test, but the tide of world politics was changing. During the period from 1945 
to 1956, Britain’s role in world affairs changed and Britain also endured indecision over 
the importance of the canal in its foreign policy. One of the main reasons for control of 
the canal vanished when India gained independence on 15 August 1947.1  The loss of 
India robbed the canal of its first importance and the Labour Government of Attlee 
pondered withdrawing from the canal.  The British obligated themselves to withdraw 
from Egypt by 1956 under the terms of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance, but the canal took on 
renewed importance during the Cold War.  During this period British policy towards the 
canal can be divided into two main phases: realization and regression.  Realization 
encompasses the British attempts to deal with the Middle East in light of the changing 
world political scene. Essentially, the realization phase represents British attempts to 
move from a heavy handed approach to the region to one of more equality through 
alliances. The phase of realization occurred under the Attlee Government. During this 
period, the British Government evacuated the Middle East and created alliances with the 
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countries of the region. In the late 1940s, the British showed a willingness to withdraw 
from Egypt and relocate to an alternative base in Palestine or Libya.  The termination of 
the Palestine Mandate ended British hopes of finding an alternative base and 
demonstrated the inability of the Arab states to defend themselves against military attack. 
Prior to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the British had hoped to develop the Arab States into 
an economic and political entity that, with Anglo-American assistance, could serve as a 
bulkhead against communist intrusion.2 The phase of regression began with the return of 
the Conservative Party to power in Great Britain in 1951.  The regressive phase refers to 
British policy returning to a heavy handed approach in the Middle East. Though 
responsible for the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the Governments of Churchill and Eden 
acted with a heavy hand in the Middle East and influenced the region much as they had 
prior to World War II.  The Conservative policy met with minimal success and was 
defeated by Egypt in efforts to form the Baghdad Pact, the dismissal of Glubb, and the 
Suez Crisis.  By the end of this period, the British withdrew from the canal but later 
returned to the region to guarantee its international character.  The British refusal to act in 
accordance with changing political tides and their failure to realize their power in 
comparison with the Soviet Union and United States resulted in the failure of Britain to 
keep the canal open. The canal had occupied a central role in the policy of many British 
Governments and, ironically, began the end of the empire. 
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 The end of the Second World War divided the world political scene between the 
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with Britain on the sidelines.  
Nevertheless, the British still viewed themselves as a world power and wanted to 
maintain their influence.  Cold War pressure encouraged an exaggerated notion of 
imperial interest with the Middle East occupying extreme importance.3  The 
independence of India took away the region’s role as the gateway to the Indian Empire, 
but afforded the region a certain level of importance.  Immediately after the war, the 
Middle East was the one region in the world where American or Soviet influence was not 
universal and Britain acted as the custodian of Western interests.4 As historian John 
Darwin noted, “Egypt was the heart of the British strategy in the Middle East and the war 
had proven the incalculable asset the land was in war with airfields, a large labor force, 
agriculture, position, and above all the canal.5 Bernard Montgomery, the hero of World 
War II, stressed the importance of the Suez base and having the installations in Egypt 
available “for use by our forces in war and … the right to station forces in strategic area 
and to move them in and through the Middle East.”6 While Britain viewed itself as a vital 
player in the Cold War, that view came to resemble more of an illusion during the post 
war period. 
                                                 
3 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: the Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World (N.Y., St. 
Martin’s Press, 1988), 145. 
4 Ibid., 155-160. 
5 Ibid., 113. 
6 Viscount Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshall, the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG (New 
York: the World Publishing Company, 1958), 376. 
 98
 Harold Macmillan, who later became prime minister after the Suez crisis of 1956, 
evaluated the situation in post-war Britain saying, 
Britain’s weakness had been temporarily concealed by the glamour of our 
victory. Authority had been enhanced by the single handed resistance to 
Hitler in 1940-41 and by the disproportionate number of forces which 
Great Britain had put into the field and their splendid feats of arms.7
 
While Montgomery advocated the indispensability of the Middle East and the use of the 
region to meet any aggression from the East, Macmillan wanted to maintain friendly 
terms with the Soviet Union.8 Macmillan realized the diminution of British power. He 
also wanted to secure Commonwealth support for British foreign policy and “reduce our 
forces as was consistent with the maintenance of our influence.”9 The differing views 
held by Montgomery and Macmillan foreshadowed the pendulum of British policy 
towards the Middle East from 1945 to 1956.  Many in Britain advocated the maintenance 
of world power status and standing guard in the region against the forces of communism 
while others were aware of the declining power of Britain.  The one aspect both sides of 
the dispute agreed upon was the importance of the Suez Canal, be it for defensive 
purposes or for access to Middle Eastern oil.  As political scientists Leon Epstein noted 
prior to World War II, “the Suez Canal emerged as the imperial lifeline, the basis of 
Britain’s world trade, and the route to India.” 10 While correct, the canal did not as much 
emerge but regained the status it held prior to the wars.  By the beginning of 1946, the 
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Middle East proved important to Britain and the one area where her power remained 
paramount; the incoming Attlee government, though, took a different view. 
 The Labour Government pursued a different foreign policy than Churchill’s 
Wartime Government and moved away from the previous heavy handed policy in the 
Middle East, but still maintained influence.  The main proponent of this policy was 
Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign Minister.  Bevin believed the Middle East was second 
in importance to Europe and that traditional intervention undermined the role of Britain 
in the region.11 The regeneration and maintenance of British influence was the only path 
to preserve Britain’s world status and to avoid relegation to the status of the 
Netherlands.12 Despite believing in the benefit of the empire, Bevin believed in the need 
to replace the empire in the Middle East with partnership.  The Suez base remained 
important and Attlee viewed it as necessary for oil, while Churchill believed the base to 
be the geographical key to the Middle East and one of the supreme geopolitical positions 
in the entire world.13 With the loss of India, the geographical relevance of Egypt lessened 
and Bevin looked for other areas to relocate the British base.  The most apparent choice 
was Palestine.  The problem was the British still viewed the Middle East as the focal 
point of communications with the empire and Commonwealth, a source of oil, a shield to 
Africa, and an irreplaceable offensive base, all which hinged on the maintenance of 
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Suez.14 The British military presence at Suez allowed Britain to dominate the region and 
maintain their influence. The control of the Suez base safeguarded the passage of oil and 
preserved imperial communications. Also, the base served as a shield to Africa since the 
British presence provided an impediment to any Soviet threat to the region. 
 The Suez Base suffered a severe lessening in importance during the early Labour 
Government.  While the military viewed the base as necessary to deter Soviet incursions, 
Bevin was willing to relocate the base to Cyrenaica. Despite Bevin’s views, the military 
viewed the Suez Canal as “vital to all British calculations, one of the principal 
justifications in imperial defense, the protection of the Indian Empire might no longer 
exist, but it remained the principal route to the East and a symbol of imperial power.”15 
The Egyptian populace wanted the British to leave and the Egyptians longed for the unity 
of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown.  Unity of the Nile Valley called for the 
union of Sudan and Egypt under the Egyptian monarchy, but had nothing to do with the 
canal. The British actions of strong arming King Farouk into accepting a Nationalist 
Government during the war humiliated Egypt and inspired Egyptian Nationalists.  The 
Labour party advocated the withdrawal from Egypt on July 5, 1946 and entered into 
discussions to hand over the canal, a change in policies unfathomable only a few years 
earlier.16
                                                 
14 Ibid., 17. 
15 Ibid., 119. 
16 Ibid., 231. 
 101
 Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Sidqi led an Egyptian delegation to London in 
1946 to discuss revisions to the 1936 Treaty of Alliance and announced that he was in 
favor of a new alliance with Britain based on the complete evacuation of British forces 
from Egypt.17 Sidqi also agreed to leave the question of Sudan out of the treaty and 
reached an agreement with Bevin in London.  The treaty entailed the evacuation of 
British troops from Egypt by 1949.18  Bevin’s offer assailed the emotional and 
psychological basis of the imperialists in Britain.19 The British base at Suez stood as one 
of the largest military bases in the world and a testimony to British industriousness and 
resourcefulness.  Additionally, the perceived sense of losing the canal was momentous 
since many British soldiers had perished to preserve the canal, only to see it handed back 
to the Egyptians in a matter of years.  The agreement implied the lessening of Britain’s 
status in the Middle East due to the paramount status of the canal in the British position 
in the region.  The agreement fell apart due to miscommunications between the two 
governments; in addition political rivalries resulted in the resignation of the Sidqi 
Government. The essential point was the willingness of the Labour Government to part 
with the canal. Another policy shift had occurred in relation to the Suez Canal.  Only 
years removed from British soldiers perishing defending the canal against the forces of 
fascism, the British believed the canal was expendable. 
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 The rationale for the attempted withdrawal from Egypt was in accordance with 
the Labour strategy of propping up the Arab states as a bulwark against communism. The 
end of the Palestine Mandate and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War scuttled this strategy and the 
prospect of withdrawal from Egypt.  The British decision to relinquish her mandatory 
power in Palestine and the subsequent creation of Israel exposed the weakness of the 
Arab states, countered British plans for an alternative base in Palestine, and lessened 
British prestige in the region.20 The relinquishment of the mandate fostered a sense of 
betrayal in the Arab world directed towards the British. Additionally, the Israeli defeat of 
the armies of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan proved the inability of the Arab 
armies to act in coordination or to achieve success.  The hope of utilizing the Arab states 
to forestall a communist attack fell apart and the British realized that their continued 
presence in the region was required.  The character of British foreign policy took a drastic 
change with the return of the Conservatives to office in 1951. 
 The Conservative Government of Churchill returned in 1951 with Anthony Eden 
as Foreign Secretary. While Parliament was in recess, the Egyptian Government 
abrogated the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the 1936 Treaty of Alliance, 
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thereby proclaiming unity of the Nile Valley.21 Though the abrogation accomplished 
little, it was a symbolic action demonstrating the Egyptian Government’s desire to 
confront Britain. Also in 1951, Egyptian labor was withdrawn from the Canal Zone and 
terrorist activity in the area increased.22 Rioting and attacks against British soldiers began 
in 1945 after there was no British move to evacuate Cairo.23 The Egyptians wanted to 
force the issue of British withdrawal and force Britain to the negotiating table.  In January 
1952, a British attack on an Egyptian police barracks touched off anti-foreign riots and 
resulted in attacks on British buildings and the massacre of several Englishmen.24 Later in 
1952, the Egyptian monarchy was abolished and a military junta installed. On 23 July 
1952, Mohamed Neguib and a few battalions of troops marched on Cairo, obtained the 
abdication of Farouk, and arranged for a new government.25 The effects of these events 
caused Eden to decide on a new settlement with the Egyptians. Eventually, Neguib 
became the Prime Minister and leader of Egypt, representing the Free Officers’ 
Movement.  While Neguib held power, Lieutenant Colonel Gamel Abdul Nasser was the 
acknowledged leader of the movement and would become the leader of Egypt within nine 
months.26 The Egyptian Revolution had eliminated any claim to Sudan and allowed for 
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the new negotiations to be solely concerned with the canal.27 Essentially, Britain could 
withdraw from the canal and still have bases in the region to defend it. 
 Foreign Minister Anthony Eden decided to pursue a new settlement focused on 
phased withdrawal, maintenance of the base for British use in times of trouble, air 
defense cooperation, Egyptian participation in a Middle East defense organization, and 
Anglo-American assistance.28 Though a Conservative, Eden was conscious that the 
empire was in the words of his secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh “overstretched world wide 
despite the winding up of the Indian Empire and he was concerned to reduce our 
commitments to what our capacity could bear.”29 He believed three options existed: 
remain in the Canal Zone, liquidation of the British position, and treaty revision. Though 
the third option would ultimately entail liquidation, Eden was concerned that an 
instantaneous withdrawal hampered the British position in the region and damaged 
British authority.30 The situation in the Middle East had changed with Greece and Turkey 
entering NATO and a proposed Middle Eastern defense organization made the British 
more willing to negotiate with the Egyptians. Also, the advent of atomic weapons 
nullified the strategic importance of the Canal base since atomic weapons could easily 
eliminate large masses of troops and bases. The 1936 Treaty was no longer applicable 
since it was signed during a time of duress.  The treaty was signed when Egypt was 
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threatened by foreign aggression and needed the British to protect Egypt from invasion. 
The Egyptians now had a large enough army and were free from any threats requiring 
British assistance. The canal was no longer threatened, the Palestine situation had turned 
Arab opinion against the British, and internal strife existed within Egypt.31 By vacating 
the canal, the British could redeem their image in the Arab world and maintain some 
influence.  In 1954, a British delegation under Anthony Head concluded an agreement 
with the Egyptian Government providing for a two year withdrawal of British troops 
from the canal and the mutual respect for the 1888 Convention.32 The treaty was a matter 
of convenience for both governments since neither wanted to continue the current state of 
affairs.33 The one weakness of the planned withdrawal was the state of belligerency 
between Egypt and Israel, which flared over the next two years. Without the British 
garrison acting as an impediment, there was a distinct possibility of the canal becoming a 
battlefield in a war between Israel and Egypt. The main reason for Britain’s withdrawal 
was financial since the British were still mired in post-war economic difficulties and the 
cost of supporting the Suez Base proved a heavy economic burden.34  
 The treaty had several noteworthy provisions. The most important was the 
withdrawal of British troops by 1956.35 It also provided for the maintenance of the base 
and the British use of the base in the event of an external attack on Turkey or the Arab 
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League.36 Article VIII provided for the upholding of the 1888 Agreement and once again 
reaffirmed the strategic importance of the canal.37 The treaty devolved into a test run of 
Egyptian maintenance of the canal. Most importantly, the treaty allowed the British to 
use the base in times of trouble and the respect for the 1888 Convention allowed for the 
free transit of the canal and the continuous flow of oil, which was vital to the economies 
of Western Europe. Britain also had bases outside of Egypt in Aden, Cyprus, Malta, and 
Iraq, which allowed for the defense of the canal. The British envisioned the Baghdad Pact 
as a way to maintain the British presence in the region.  Finally, the Canal Company still 
controlled the canal and thus the canal was still European. Churchill was not pleased with 
the development uttering “we have thrown our glorious empire away,” he continued in 
office to save Eden from discrediting himself over Egypt.38 Churchill feared the canal 
handover would ruin Eden’s political career and make Eden’s candidacy as Prime 
Minister doomed to failure. Eden was pleased. He succeeded in maintaining the flow of 
oil, without which the British could not live and would be strangled to death.39 By the end 
of 1954, the situation in the Middle East appeared resolved and the threat of attacks on 
Britain minimal.  The ascension of Eden to Prime Minister followed and Eden hoped to 
emerge from the shadows of Churchill to take the position he had long sought.  
Unfortunately, the Middle East troubles flared up during the Eden Ministry with Nasser 
and the Soviets attempting to rid the region of the British. 
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 Many events in the Middle East came to a head and resulted in the Suez Crisis in 
1956.  At the time, Anthony Eden’s health deteriorated. In 1953 three operations had 
weakened him physically and Eden suffered from reoccurring jaundice. After thirty years 
of struggling with dictators, his mental abilities sagged.40 The diminished state of the 
Prime Minister figured into the rash decision making in the lead up to the Suez Crisis.  
Three main events laid the groundwork for the Suez Crisis: the Czech arms deal of 1955, 
the dismissal of Glubb of 1955, and the Aswan Dam proposal of 1956.  In 1956, Eden 
held a summit with First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita 
Khrushchev and Soviet Premier Marshal Bulganin in London.  During the course of the 
meeting, Eden told the Soviet statesmen that “the uninterrupted supply of oil was literally 
vital to our economy … and that we could not live without oil and we had no intention of 
being strangled to death.”41 This statement provided Eden’s logic for British actions 
during the Suez crisis.  Eden’s Under Secretary in the Foreign Office Evelyn Shuckburgh 
described the British position in the Middle East in the early 1950s as follows: 
We were the dominant power throughout the area. We had a huge military 
base on the Suez Canal, a naval base at Aden, air squadrons stationed in 
Iraq, rear bases in Cyprus and Malta; we paid for and provided the 
commander of the Arab Legion in Jordan. We had protectorates over 
Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms, whose foreign relations we conducted through a 
political resident in Bahrain. We had enormous oil investments in Iran and 
a growing interest in Gulf oil. All were under attack in one way or 
another.42
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Shuckburgh was correct in his assertion and the British dominance of the Middle East 
was soon under siege.  The forces of pan Arabism and Nasser targeted the British 
presence in the Middle East and called for the expulsion of Britain from the region. 
Conflict against British control in Cyprus, pro Nasser propaganda in Jordan, and the 
Abadan crisis in Iran had lessened the British stature in the region. In 1951, Muhammad 
Mussadeq, the Nationalist Prime Minister of Iran, nationalized the Anglo-Persian oil 
Company and the Abadan Oilfields.43 The British eventually negotiated a settlement with 
the Iranians rather than invading, thus showing an unwillingness to act with a strong 
hand.44
 At the beginning of the Eden Ministry, the British position in the Middle East was 
relatively intact.  Though the 1954 Agreement had called for the evacuation of British 
troops from the Canal Zone, the troops stayed in place for another year.  Also, the British 
alliances with Iraq and Jordan appeared solid.  But the intrusion of the Soviets into the 
region shattered this illusion.  Additionally, the emergence of Nasser proved a great 
trouble to the Eden Ministry. Nasser was among the officers involved in the Revolution 
of 1952 and was widely acknowledged as the driving force behind the movement.45 He 
was involved in underground activity since his days as a student and had distinguished 
himself in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.46 Nasser became President, Prime Minister, and 
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Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council on February 24,195447 Nasser was in 
power during the 1954 Agreement and worked to remove the British from Egypt. 
However, Nasser’s goal was leadership of the Arab world and the British sponsored 
Baghdad Pact proved a competitor and a challenge to Nasser.48 The trouble began on 
September 27, 1955 when Nasser announced an agreement to purchase arms from the 
Soviet Bloc through Czechoslovakia.49 Nasser reasoned that the 1950 Tripartite 
Declaration of Britain, France, and the United States, which prohibited any arms deal 
which would tip the military balance in the Arab-Israeli dispute, prevented access to prior 
sources of arms.  Nasser found a ready supplier in the Soviet Union.  This development 
led to the Soviets gaining a foothold in the most strategically important area of the 
Middle East in British eyes and an alliance with the most charismatic of Arab Leaders: 
Nasser.  To combat and prevent the Soviet intrusion into the Middle East, the British 
attempted to build a security alliance covering the Middle East, the resulting alliance was 
known as the Baghdad Pact.50 The pact was built on the Turco-Iraqi alliance and grew to 
also include Britain, Iran, and Pakistan, forming a defensive shield against communism 
stretching from the Mediterranean to the Himalayas.51The arms deal also rendered Egypt 
ineligible for the Baghdad Pact due to their perceived alliance with the Soviets and 
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Nasser’s verbal attack on Nuri Said of Iraq and Glubb Pasha of Jordan.52 The attacks 
came about the same time as the visit of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir John 
Templar to Jordan to aid in the renewed negotiations over the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 
Alliance.  The dispatch of such a high ranking official to Jordan demonstrated the 
weakness of the British position. Templar had been sent to convince King Hussein of 
Jordan to place his country in the Baghdad Pact; his negotiations ultimately failed.53 
Previously a simple word from the British ambassador in Amman or the Commander of 
the Arab Legion Glubb Pasha resulted in Jordan following British advice; but the highest 
ranking military official in Britain held no sway over a minor Arab monarch.  While 
these events were disheartening to Eden, especially when coupled with the Czech arms 
deal, further events in Jordan would diminish the British standing in the Middle East and 
generate Eden’s fervent hatred of Nasser. 
 Beginning in 1952, Egyptian promoted Free Officer pamphlets espousing pan-
Arabism and anti-British messages began to appear in Jordan.54 In these pamphlets, their 
authors labeled Britain as the enemy and exploiter of the Arabs.55 Pan Arabism was the 
idea of a united Arab front against imperialism and the union of the Arab States. Nasser 
was the main proponent of pan Arabism and his allegiance to this doctrine endangered 
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the British position in the Middle East.56 Nasser took steps to unify with other Arab states 
and assume the mantle of Arab leadership, to do this he had to oppose the British and 
Israelis. By targeting the British presence in the Middle East, Nasser was able to portray 
himself as the defender of the Arab States and his position tended to rely on his 
opposition to Britain. The appearance of the pamphlets and the growing popularity of 
Nasser targeted Glubb, the commander of the Arab Legion, a symbol of British influence 
in the region, and one of the most powerful men in Jordan.  On March 1 1956, the Prime 
Minister of Jordan summoned the British ambassador to the Palace to inform him of the 
King Hussein’s s decision to dismiss Glubb.57 The rationale provided by the king was the 
constant references in the press to Glubb being the true power in Jordan and Eden 
believed the young monarch was jealous of Glubb.58 The aftermath witnessed the king 
and Nasser being cheered in the same breath.  Additionally, the meeting between Nasser 
and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd did little to alleviate suspicion.  According to 
Mohammad Heikal, a Cairo editor and confidant of Nasser, when Lloyd and Nasser met 
and discussed the dismissal, Nasser was quite happy thinking the British had seen the 
anachronistic quality of Glubb’s role and removed him.59 Lloyd visited Egypt on his tour 
of the Middle East and India. Lloyd and Eden took the response to mean Nasser had a 
hand in the dismissal of Glubb.  Eden was angry enough to consider reneging on the 1954 
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treaty’s evacuation clause as way of countering the loss of Glubb.60 Eden compared 
Nasser to Mussolini earlier in the year and his hatred of the upstart Egyptian leader 
continued to grow.61 He blamed Nasser for all attacks on British interests in the Middle 
East and determined to alleviate the threat.62 In the following months, Eden informed 
visiting Soviet dignitaries of the British need of oil warning them that Britain would fight 
to protect her oil supply.  By April 1956, a struggle between Eden and Nasser for 
dominance of the Middle East was brewing and Nasser’s next move brought events to 
war footing.  Nasser gained a free hand due to the removal of British forces from Egypt 
on June 13 1956 at 6:45 A.M.63 On that day the Union Jack was hauled down from the 
Navy House at Port Said and seventy years of occupation ended.64 Nasser was free to act 
without threat of immediate British retaliation despite his comments to Minister at Large 
Selwyn Lloyd stating, “we cannot understand why you are worrying about these matters 
now. We will be friends with when the attack comes. We will make a pact then.”65 No 
pact was made. 
 At a cost of thirteen hundred million dollars, a fee the Egyptians could not meet, 
the Egyptian Government proposed the Aswan High Dam in 1955 to improve Nile Valley 
irrigation and develop hydroelectricity.66 The Egyptians appealed to the World Bank for 
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funding and Nasser seized upon the construction of the dam as a national goal.67 The 
British were concerned by Nasser’s course of action if the project was not funded and 
feared that it might result in the possible seizure of the canal and disruption of European 
economic life.68 The main power behind the World Bank was the United States and the 
proposal was not popular in Congress.  The publicity associated with the dam 
construction threatened to lead to exorbitant requests from other Arab countries. Eden 
commented on the effect of the dam on the Arab world by saying,  
if there was to be charity, then friendly Arab countries had the right to 
apply. They could hardly be expected to view with enthusiasm the 
advance of large sums for an Egyptian project while the country was 
becoming ever more closely linked with Soviet Russia and while Egyptian 
propaganda was attacking both them and us.69  
 
 Essentially, giving aid to Nasser suggested rewarding his overtures to the Soviets. 
Suspicions of Nasser and his ties to the Soviet Union led the Americans to pull out of the 
World Bank negotiations.  Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein’s statement that if the 
United States would not fund the dam, then the Soviets would, proved the impetus for the 
withdrawal.70 United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed Hussein’s 
statement to be a threat of blackmail and broke off the negotiations.71 With the option of 
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World Bank funding revoked, Nasser turned to the only other funding opportunity 
available: the canal itself.  On 26 July 1956, Nasser spoke in Alexandria and said, 
We shall never repeat the past, but we shall eliminate the past by 
reclaiming our rights to the Suez Canal. This money is ours and this canal 
belongs to Egypt because it is an Egyptian limited liability company. We 
shall build the High Dam and we shall obtain our usurped right. We shall 
build the High Dam as we desire we are determined. Thirty five million 
pounds annually is taken by the Canal Company. Therefore I have signed 
today and the government has approved the following: a resolution 
adopted by the president of the republic for the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal. 72
 
With this action, Nasser confirmed the worst fears and suspicions of the British 
Government.  The British had fought for the canal several times before to protect the 
route to India, now the issue was whether or not Britain would fight for their oil supply 
and influence in the Middle East. 
 The Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal panicked and infuriated the British 
Government, particularly Anthony Eden. As historian John Darwin noted,  
the vital strategic waterway whose security had preoccupied British 
strategy since the 1870s passed under the direct physical control of a local 
power fiercely hostile to British influence. Full measure of British 
weakness became clear.73
 
Eden also saw an opportunity to deal with the upstart leader of Egypt and to end his 
challenge to British power.  Upon hearing the news, Eden was furious and remarked “our 
whole position demands strong action. I want to seize the canal and take charge of it 
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again.”74 When informed that Nasser’s action was legal, Eden showed his true hatred of 
Nasser by saying, “I don’t care whether it’s legal or not, I ‘m not going to let him do it ... 
he’s not going to get away with it.”75 Though the canal was no longer under British 
protection and the nationalization was a perfectly legal maneuver, the perceived value of 
the canal precipitated a militant British reaction. 
 The British viewed the canal as vital to their well being due to its role in oil 
supply and regional influence.  Eden identified three main concerns over the canal 
seizure.  The first concern was that the “canal was an international asset and had been 
recognized as such ever since the Convention of 1888.”76 Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Harold Macmillan believed that “such a flagrant breach of international convention 
would lead to a decline in international good faith reminiscent of world wars.”77 The 
development of Middle Eastern oil and the Western European reliance on the canal for oil 
transport provided another reason for the necessity of the canal to the empire.  Finally, 
Eden believed the canal formed the centerpiece of British influence in the region. He 
remarked “failure to keep the canal international would inevitably lead to the loss one by 
one of all our interests and assets in the Middle East, and even if Her Majesty’s 
Government had to act alone they could not stop short of using force to protect their 
position.”78 Eden viewed Nasser as the enemy of Western influence in the Middle East 
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and following in the footsteps of Hitler.79 The British had missed an opportunity to check 
the fascists before World War II and the acquiescence at Munich weighed heavy in their 
minds.  This time they took no chances and on July 27 the Prime Minister instructed the 
Chiefs of Staff to prepare an invasion plan.80 The British would not sit back and watch 
their influence assaulted. 
 The British attempted to evict Nasser from the canal through diplomacy.  On July 
28, the British Government summoned a conference of maritime powers and froze 
Egyptian assets.81 The United States, Great Britain, and France participated at the 
conference.  During the meeting Eden proposed direct action against Nasser and Robert 
Murphy of the United States State Department remarked, “it seemed impossible for Eden 
to keep in mind how much Britain’s power had diminished in relation to the United 
States and Russia.”82 While the Americans viewed the crisis as an international matter 
and favored a diplomatic solution, the French sided with Britain and favored direct 
action. The French Government believed Nasser was supplying Algerian nationalists in 
their struggle with France. As a result France supplied weapons to the Israelis in hope of 
toppling Nasser.83 In deference to the Americans, Eden and the British Government 
agreed to convene a conference of the signatories of the 1888 Convention.  The First 
London Conference was the beginning of several failed diplomatic initiatives to end the 
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crisis before hostilities commenced.  Prior to the conference, Eden broadcast to the 
British people, “we cannot agree that an act of plunder which threatens the livelihood of 
many nations shall be allowed to succeed.”84
  While in public the British favored a political solution, the Chiefs of Staff 
formulated four methods of invading Egypt on August 3 with Alexandria and Port Said 
both targets. 85 The London Conference began on August 16, 1956. The end result of the 
conference was a declaration for an international board including Egypt to oversee the 
canal and to maintain the canal as apolitical.  A delegation headed by the Prime Minister 
of Australia Robert Menzies carried the conference resolution to Nasser.86As the Menzies 
mission disembarked, the British Government pondered other diplomatic solutions and 
the prospect of military action.  The Foreign Ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands, 
Paul Henri Spaak and Joseph Luns, argued for the NATO powers to refuse recognition of 
the canal seizure and Spaak believed if “the Western powers quailed, he foresaw a long 
series of retreats before them in Africa and the Middle East.”87 Eden agreed with this 
view and had received reports from East Africa and Aden foreshadowing unrest in the 
Muslim world.88 The Menzies mission was in Egypt from September 2-9 and Nasser 
rejected the London Conference proposal for the Suez Canal, dismissing it as collective 
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colonialism, and refused the overture due to infringements on Egyptian sovereignty.89 
Nasser and Menzies took an instantaneous dislike of one another and this poor 
relationship hampered negotiations.90 In a conversation with Menzies, Nasser stated 
What is your problem? ... Freedom of Navigation?  I’m ready to discuss 
that. Tolls ? I’m ready to discuss that. The British press charges that I’m 
trying to build an empire? We can discuss that too if you want-but I will 
not discuss Egyptian sovereignty. Perhaps you would like to discuss 
British fears that I am going to cut off the lifeline of their empire? If I did 
that, it would mean war with Britain. Do you think I’m crazy enough to do 
that? And if I was so crazy how could the international board that you 
propose prevent me from doing that in any case. 91
  
The failure of the Menzies mission served to exacerbate the situation between Britain and 
Egypt.  Nasser did not appear open to diplomacy and was firmly aware of the accusations 
against him.  Additionally, he was resolute in his unwillingness to permit any 
international authority over the canal or to give Britain an impetus for military action. 
Eden’s use of diplomacy to resolve the crisis was failing. 
 During late August and September 1956, Eden not only had to balance the 
situation with Nasser, but also domestic opinion on the canal seizure and the Atlantic 
Alliance.  The British Government believed that “every day Nasser was strengthening his 
hold on the canal. The Western powers would lose face unless they could react clearly 
and speedily to his rejection of the eighteen power proposals.”92 The problem was with 
Nasser backed by the Soviets, the British needed the Americans on their side and it was 
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difficult to make out where the Americans stood.93 Additionally, it was an election year 
and the American diplomats were under instructions to oppose intervention, so as not to 
hinder Eisenhower’s reelection chances.94 The Americans also espoused an anti-colonial 
rhetoric and the possible embarrassment of association with a perceived imperial 
intervention threatened their standing in the struggle with the Soviets.  By the time 
Nasser rejected the London Conference proposals carried by the Menzies mission, the 
Americans had proposed another diplomatic solution: the User’s Club.  While the 
Americans were avoiding any intervention, the British public took a different view. 
 The British Public and the Suez Group forced Eden to gravitate between two 
different solutions to the Suez Crisis.  In a British Institute of Public Opinion poll on 
Military Action in Egypt taken from August 16-24, 1956, thirty-three percent of British 
citizens advocated military action against Nasser.95 A September 5-6, 1956 poll on the 
issue of an ultimatum with possible invasion, thirty four percent of those surveyed 
advocated the ultimatum and forty-seven percent of Conservatives surveyed.96 The polls 
indicated a lack of decision on the part of the British public, which favored economic and 
political sanctions.  While the public was not ready for war, a group within Eden’s own 
party was.  The Suez Group was a group of Conservative back benchers still bitter over 
Britain’s imperial retreat and who “thought that Britain would amount to very little in the 
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world if it could not exert effective leadership of a larger unit.”97 The Suez Group 
believed British dominance of the Middle East was the main claim Britain could make to 
world power status. Without this dominance, the British world position would lessen. The 
group also believed the Indian withdrawal to have been predicated on the continued 
British presence in Egypt and did not favor further British withdrawals in the Middle 
East.98 The Suez Group wanted action against Nasser as a way to avoid another British 
imperial retreat. When the crisis began the Suez Group jumped at the opportunity to 
weaken Nasser and to reassert the British dominance in the Middle East.  As the crisis 
dragged on, it became more and more apparent that Eden would have to choose between 
direct action or giving in to Nasser. 
 As Egyptian control of the canal entered its second month in September 1956, the 
British struggled with American insistence on a diplomatic solution.  United States 
Secretary of State John Dulles proposed the formation of a Suez Canal User’s Club 
(SCUA) to work to implement the 1888 Convention, cooperate with Egypt, and prevent 
canal traffic from coming under political influence.99 A conference of the proposed 
SCUA was called in September 1956 in London. The House of Commons met on 
September 12 to discuss the Middle East and the Labour party asked Eden to refer the 
issue to the Security Council or the International Court of Justice.100 The reason for the 
hostile nature of Labour’s attack were comments by both Dulles and President 
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Eisenhower stating they did not wish to see Britain shoot their way through the canal. 101 
The Americans forced the British to agree to the SCUA proposal to preclude the use of 
force, though the only measures of enforcement the club had were asset freezing and re-
routing.  The existence of enforcement measures provided the difference between the 
London Conference proposals and the SCUA. The possibility of re-routing allowed 
Nasser to get away with his theft and would hinder the oil supplies of Western Europe: 
Nasser would win.102  Nasser termed the SCUA an association for waging war and 
accused the eighteen powers of the First London Conference of “international thuggery 
and imperialism.”103 Nasser objected to the SCUA due to his belief that the canal was an 
Egyptian possession and should not be subject to international control. The dispute 
shaped up to be one of imperialism versus nationalism with Britain as aggressor.  Worst 
of all for Eden, the Egyptians proved effective at running the canal.  While the SCUA 
was scuttled by Nasser’s refusal, the issue went to the United Nations. 
 On September 26, 1956, Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris and conferred with their 
French counterparts. The French had shown themselves to be Britain’s staunchest ally in 
the canal dispute. Eden assured the French that British Government had not abandoned 
their objective of removing the canal from the control of a single government, preserving 
efficient navigation, and to prevent the Middle East from coming under Soviet 
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domination.104 The two governments agreed to coordinate their position in the upcoming 
Security Council debate.  Eden also added that the Egyptian attack on treaties had 
endangered international confidence.105 On October 1, the inaugural meeting of the 
SCUA occurred in London and the discussion of the canal nationalization began at the 
United Nations Security Council.  A British sponsored resolution was debated on October 
13 and entailed six principles on which settlement must abide, 
1. There should be free and open transit through the canal without 
discrimination, covert or overt. 
2. The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected 
3. The operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of any 
country. 
4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by 
agreement between Egypt and the users. 
5. A fair proportion of the due should be allotted to development  
6. In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal 
Company and Egyptian Government should be settled by 
arbitration.106 
 
The Security Council adopted these six principles unanimously, but the second part of the 
resolution proved difficult.107 The operative portion called for the governments of Britain, 
France, and Egypt to continue their interchange, free passage to all shipping, the payment 
of SCUA member dues to the SCUA, and Egyptian cooperation in canal management.108 
The Soviet Union vetoed the second part of the resolution.  The British wanted a 
settlement to preserve the international character of the canal and had tried several 
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diplomatic solutions.  Nothing had worked and Nasser still controlled the canal. Another 
option had to be pursued.  
 By the middle of October 1956, diplomacy had failed the British government.  
Nasser rebuffed the First London Conference and the Menzies Mission, he viewed the 
proposals as an infringement upon Egyptian sovereignty.  The SCUA lacked any power 
of enforcement and would hurt Western Europe more than Egypt, but it too was 
dismissed by Nasser as international thuggery.  The United Nations Security Council 
agreed upon the six principles of settlement for the crisis, but the resolution was vetoed 
by the Soviets.  The Suez Group lobbied Eden to act with authority in the Middle East 
and the French were willing to support the British.  The British public, though not 
favoring immediate military action, desired a settlement of some form. Finally, Nasser’s 
reputation and celebrity in the Arab world grew with each day he defied the British. In 
his September response to the Menzies mission, Nasser had stated he would not enter into 
hostilities with the British. Were the British to attack Egypt, the move would be 
perceived as imperialistic throughout the world and would risk losing American support. 
Eden had exhausted all diplomatic options and military action was becoming the best 
solution. 
 The British still publicly claimed to respect international agreements and the 
desire to preserve free navigation of the canal as their goal.  As long as Nasser effectively 
ran the canal, little chance existed of these goals allowing military action.  Events in the 
Middle East brought matters to a head.  The Israeli raid on Gaza in 1955 had heightened 
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border tensions between Israel and Egypt.109 Nasser’s flow of arms from the Eastern Bloc 
and the subsequent arms flow to Syria pointed to a coming Arab-Israeli war. Egypt also 
attempted to enlist Jordan, with whom the British had a defense treaty, into an alliance 
and pro-Nasser elements had emerged victorious in the Jordanian elections of 1956.110 
On October 10, 1956, Israeli troops entered the Jordanian village of Qalqiya, killing forty 
eight Jordanians before they withdrew upon the arrival of the Arab Legion.111 The raid 
was in response to Palestinian raids into Israeli territory. Not only did Israel benefit from 
a superior army, but since 1955 they had been receiving a steady supply of French 
armaments and equipment.112 The situation in the Middle East was dangerous.  The 
Israelis had taken military action against both Egypt and Jordan within two years.  In the 
event of an Israeli attack on Jordan, Britain was treaty bound to honor her alliance with 
Jordan.  If Israel attacked Egypt, the safety of the canal would be jeopardized.  No matter 
which course the Israeli Government took, Britain would be involved. 
 In late October 1956, two momentous events in Cold War history occurred. On 
October 23, 1956 the first reports of the disturbances in Hungary appeared and on 
October 25, the British Government received a report that the Israeli army was 
mobilizing.113 On October 29, the Israeli army moved into the Sinai Peninsula and 
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attacked Egyptian positions.114 The beginning of the Israeli attack on Egypt yielded a 
great historic debate over the collusion between the British, French, and Israel and the so-
called Sevres Protocol.  Historian Terrence Robertson was one of the first to assert this 
theory and believed that the Israeli attack was orchestrated to allow the Anglo-French 
invasion.115 Historian Donald Neff subscribed to this view and accepted the collusion as 
accepted fact in his work, allowing for a greater portrayal the Suez Crisis as a colonial 
action.116 Selwyn Lloyd vehemently denied any collusion and though Eden believed the 
Israelis to have cause for the attack, made no mention of the Sevres Protocol.117Recent 
scholarship has confirmed the collusion and no source more vividly illustrates the extent 
of the plotting as Edward Heath’s The Course of My Life: My Autobiography.118 The 
course of the collusion is at times convoluted, but when looked at as a whole describes 
the last great peak in the British attachment to the Suez Canal. 
 The beginning of the collusion occurred on September 10, 1956 with the arrival of 
French Premier Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in London for crisis 
talks.119 The French favored direct airborne action against Nasser and Eden agreed since 
an attack on Cairo would not be received well in the world political climate.120 The 
Americans were vehemently against military action and realized that an increase in oil 
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exports from the United States, Venezuela, and Canada coupled with redirection of 
tankers round the Cape Route would sustain European oil: the strangulation argument 
was debunked.121 In addition, Eisenhower was not prepared to commit the United States 
to military action over the canal. The British and French tried to force the issue of 
military action by having the Suez Canal Company order its pilots off the job on 
September 14, but the Egyptians proved more than capable of running the canal122 On 
September 12, 1956, Eden announced in Commons that Britain would take action if 
Egypt ignored her obligations under the 1888 Convention.123 The problem was the 
Americans did not back the British and John Foster Dulles denied American support for 
any British plan to “shoot their way through the canal.124 Dulles’ statement effectively 
gave Nasser the victory since without American support and unprovoked European 
assault appeared impossible. Meetings in Paris proved Nasser wrong. 
 On September 23, 1956 Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was in Paris for 
talks and Pineau flew to London to raise the possibility of collusion with the Israelis. If 
Israel attacked Egypt, the British and French could go in as peacekeepers. Eden was quite 
intrigued by the proposition, but Selwyn Lloyd was apathetic, more concerned about the 
effect on Britain’s Middle East position.125 On September 20, Eden and Lloyd flew to 
Paris to allegedly discuss the European Free Trade Area, but went to plan the assault. In 
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order to cover their tracks, Britain announced that Her Majesty’s Government would 
honor her treaty obligations with Jordan, if Jordan were attacked by Israel.126 Britain 
appeared to be anti-Israeli and the possibility of war in the Middle East pointed to an 
Israeli-Jordanian affair. On October 23, 1956, the Sevres Protocol was signed calling for 
Israeli to attack Egypt and the French to veto any anti-Israeli resolutions in the United 
Nations.127 Eden consented to this agreement and the planned ultimatum and invasion 
appeared set in stone. Eden was determined that Nasser and his regime must be brought 
down.128 Upon the signing of the agreement, Eden gathered Lloyd, Macmillan, and Chief 
Whip Edward Heath together and stated “we’ve got an agreement Israel had agreed to 
invade Egypt. We shall then send in our forces backed up by the French, to separate the 
combatants and regain the canal.”129 Such was the resolve of Eden to defend the canal 
that he conspired to regain control through subterfuge. 
 Upon receiving the news of Israeli mobilization, the British Cabinet decided that 
in the event of hostilities, Israel would defeat Egypt.  The issue was how to protect the 
canal.  The Cabinet decided that in such an event, France and Britain would call upon 
both parties to cease hostilities, withdraw a certain distance from the canal, and intervene 
if one side refused compliance.130 By October 30, the Israelis were halfway to the canal 
and the possibility of the canal becoming a battle ground existed, in violation of Article 
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IV of the 1888 Constantinople Agreement.  A possibility also existed of Jordan and Syria 
joining the war and Eden decided that the arrival of British troops would prompt these 
two countries to inaction.  With the United Nations and several diplomatic conferences 
having failed, the ultimatum was the best course of action.  On October 30 1956, the 
British Cabinet met and decided to issue the ultimatum and Eden announced the decision 
to the House of Commons at 4:30 P.M, by saying “that the French and British 
Governments were agreed that everything should be done to bring hostilities to an 
end.”131  The ultimatum called for a cessation of hostilities and the two sides to withdraw 
ten miles from the canal.  He further announced that the purpose was to separate the 
belligerents and guarantee the free navigation of the canal.132 He described the possible 
occupation of the canal area by British and French troops as temporary and Eden 
announced a Security Council meeting would be sought immediately.  On the evening of 
October 30, the Security Council met and the United States proposed a resolution calling 
for an immediate end to hostilities, an Israeli withdrawal, and urging all members to 
restrain from force.133 The proposed resolution took away the British ultimatum and 
proposed nothing in its place; this proposal resulted in the first British use of her veto 
power on the council.  A subsequent Soviet resolution was vetoed by Britain and France, 
the ultimatum had been issued and the British were not going to let the American and 
Soviet resolutions counteract it.  The veto was in keeping with the Sevres Protocol. The 
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Egyptians rejected the ultimatum and on October 31, the British agreed to commence air 
attacks on the Egyptian air force.134 On November 1 at 10:29 P.M., Selwyn Lloyd 
announced the commencement of hostilities in the House of Commons.135  
 The British prepared for an invasion from the outset of the crisis and forces had 
been standing ready since mid-September.  The plan called for four phases.  The first 
phase consisted of the elimination of the Egyptian air force followed by the second phase, 
air attacks on Egyptian military installations.  The third phase was an airborne landing in 
the canal zone followed by a seaborne landing at the opening of the canal. While a lack of 
landing craft hampered the invasion plan, it was incalculable that Egypt would stand up 
to the combined force of Britain and France.  The attacks had an opposite effect.  Allied 
air attacks stiffened Egyptian resolve and morale, Nasser broke diplomatic relations with 
Britain and France, ordered all British and French citizens to register with authorities 
within three days, and most importantly ordered the blockage of the canal.136 The very 
reason for British intervention was at risk and Nasser was not backing down.  On 
November 1, Radio Cairo announced the sinking of fifty ships thereby blocking the 
canal. 137 On November 3, 1956 Egypt’s ally Syria broke diplomatic relations with 
Britain and France and blew up the Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline crossing Syria.138 
The objectives of Eden’s Government were defunct.  The oil supply to Europe was 
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blocked by the ships in the canal and the pipeline sabotaged.  The preservation of free 
navigation through the canal was impossible.  The British influence in the Middle East 
dwindled due to her perceived alliance with Israel and Nasser’s growing popularity 
stemming from his defiance of Britain.  The battle continued in the field and in the 
political sphere. 
 While events on the ground went against the British, the Labour Party and the 
United Nations also assailed the British decision to use force.  Near fisticuffs 
characterized the Commons debate on November 1 and Eden was booed and greeted with 
cries that he should  resign.139 Labour Member Aneurin Bevan accused the Eden 
Government of bullying Egypt and acting towards Egypt as the Nazis had towards 
Norway. A motion of censure failed and Eden survived on party lines.140 On November 2 
the United Nations General Assembly, operating under the Uniting for Peace Plan, 
debated events in Egypt with the United States leading the diplomatic attack on Britain. 
The Uniting for Peace Plan was a United Nations maneuver which allowed a debate to be 
sent from the Security Council to the General Assembly, where no vetoes were 
applicable. The resolution called for an immediate cease fire, a prohibition of further 
military goods into the area, and an emergency session of the General Assembly until the 
crisis was over. The resolution passed sixty-four to five, only Britain, France, Israel, 
Australia, and New Zealand voted against the resolution.141 Eden announced to 
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Commons that the British were not prepared to halt their action as long as hostilities 
continued and the Anglo-French forces would hand over their position to a United 
Nations police force if created.142  On November 4, the Cabinet met to discuss the 
progress of the land invasion as the Canadian delegation to the United Nations drafted a 
resolution for the formation of a UN police force.143 The problem was the Israelis had 
already taken the Sinai by November 3 and the Egyptians had retreated from the 
Peninsula. Without a United Nations force, Eden decided to proceed with the invasion 
and Britain and France announced they were landing troops to assure the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops from Egypt.144  David Ben-Gurion was outraged at the statement and 
announced Israeli acceptance of the cease fire.145 On November 5, the airborne landing 
began and on November 6, the seaborne landing occurred.146 With Israel and Egypt 
having accepted the ceasefire, Eden announced to Commons, “Her Majesty’s 
Government are ordering their forces to ceasefire at midnight GMT unless they are 
attacked.”147 British forces were in a position to seize the canal, but Eden lost his resolve 
due to British economic difficulties. French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau recalled, “ 
I hear a broken voice that of a man who has exhausted the limits of his own resistance 
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and is ready to let himself drown. In substance he says, it is no longer possible, we must 
stop, the pound has dropped again we risk panic.”148
 The British involvement in the Suez War lasted five days. Casualties proved 
minimal and the Government had deployed over ten thousand men to Egypt, but events 
spiraled out of Eden’s control.  Three main forces ended the British action: oil, the British 
economy, and world opinion.  The canal blockage and pipeline detonation hampered the 
oil reserves of Britain and rationing had to be imposed.149 The cost of the invasion 
brought economic troubles with gold and dollar reserves falling fifty seven million 
dollars in September, eighty-four million in October, and three hundred nine million in 
November, Britain needed dollars to purchase oil from alternative sources.150  The British 
pound was dependent on the American dollar and, despite financial crises in the late 
1940s, de facto convertibility of transferable sterling had been achieved.151 The British 
Government strove to make the pound convertible into gold and dollars, but the position 
of the pound was precarious. As early as August 1956, the British financial officials 
feared attacks on the pound or curtailed oil supplies would hamper the pound.152 Both 
these fears were realized. Numerous Arab countries refused to sell oil for pounds and the 
British had to use dollar reserves to purchase oil.153 The pound devalued as gold and 
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dollar reserves plummeted as the Bank of England tried to maintain convertibility and the 
pound began to lose value.154 The only way to salvage the British economy was from 
outside aid. With the devaluing of the pound, the only currency stable enough to bail out 
the British was the dollar, but the Americans were not in a generous mood. The only 
available source of aid was the Americans and they would not discuss economic aid until 
the British troops withdrew, which they did on December 22.  The Egyptian Government 
also would not contemplate clearing the canal until the British withdrew from Egypt.155 
The Middle East ceased to look to Britain for guidance and the Soviets and Americans 
entered the region.  The Soviets gained a foothold in the Middle East and soon signed 
arms deals with Iraq, Syria, and Libya.  Nasser gained immense popularity and became 
an Arab hero.  The statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps at Port Said was dynamited on 
December 24 and the Egyptians removed the last vestige of European control of the 
canal.156 Eden resigned as prime minister shortly after the crisis and his successor Harold 
Macmillan oversaw the break up of the empire.  The Iraqi Government of Nuri Said, the 
most pro-British of Arab statesmen, fell in 1958 and Said and the royal family of Iraq 
were murdered.157 With the assassination of Said, the last foothold of the British in the 
Middle East disappeared. 
The collusion had backfired and events following the cease fire acceptance and an 
appraisal of the Suez Crisis are described by Edward Heath, 
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Eden told his cabinet secretary on 14 December to destroy all relevant 
documents and the Sevres Protocol. Despite later revelations, Eden never 
changed his position. At the time he was absolutely convinced that the 
prevention of a dictator getting his own way was in the interest of Britain, 
the Middle East, and the world as a whole. He considered it essential to 
safeguard world peace and the vital trade routes of ourselves and our 
friends. The fact that we managed for so long after the canal was closed 
with the alternative route around the cape, and developed carriers of larger 
tonnage for that purposed proved how wrong that premise was, but it does 
not alter the genuine nature of his concern. Similarly, the fact that once the 
canal was opened, the Egyptians were able to run it so easily contradicted 
all the previous assertions that an international consortium was essential 
for operational purposes if traffic through the canal was to survive. But 
that was a genuine belief at the time. Eden also claimed that introducing 
international control backed by international forces into the Middle East 
would limit Nasser’s power and this was a future safeguard against any 
future expansionist ideas from him. The fact that later his expansionism 
led him into Yemen and into treaties with Syrian and Libya rather counter 
this claim.158
 
While Heath, believed the operation was a failure and fiasco, Lloyd and Eden took a 
different view. 
Eden believed the operation was a success and prevented the establishment of a 
pan-Arab empire.159 He noted the Israeli access to the canal and the prevention of 
Egyptian control of both sides of the canal. The latter portion is in error since the 
Egyptians controlled both sides of the canal until 1967. Selwyn Lloyd provided a balance 
sheet of the crisis in his memoirs.  He believed that negative results from the crisis 
existed: diplomatic defeat, failure to establish international control of the canal, the 
failure to enhance an Arab-Israeli settlement, and the psychological blow of the defeat to 
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the British people.160  Two of the three negatives identified by Lloyd for British actions in 
Suez were accomplished: the prevention of a general conflagration of hostilities and the 
checking of Nasser.161 Lloyd also contended the events of 1956 did not detract from 
British influence in the Middle East and led to closer Anglo-American cooperation.162 
The enhanced Anglo-American cooperation derived from the British realization that it 
was impossible for Britain to act in opposition to the Americans. The British viewed 
cooperation with the Americans as a sure way to avoid the mistakes of 1956. The end 
result was the relegation of Britain from world power status.  While Eden and Lloyd are 
correct in the beneficial aspects of Suez, the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance and the 
checking of Nasser, the events of 1956 had three main results for the British.  First, the 
only claim Britain had to world power was as an ally of the Americans.  Secondly, British 
hegemony in the Middle East was replaced by a Soviet-American struggle for hegemony 
with Britain playing the role of outlier. Third, the war exposed the weakness of the 
British Empire and the victory of Nasser led to similar leaders arising throughout the 
world demanding independence from the British Empire. Finally, the results of the crisis 
forced Anthony Eden, the heir to Churchill and the imperial symbolism associated with 
that title, from office and the result was the Conservative Party oversaw the dissolution of 
the British Empire.  As Chester Cooper, a member of the CIA during the crisis observed, 
In three bitter wars British forces had met and vanquished 
formidable enemies near the Nile. Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, 
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Mussolini, and Hitler each tried to gain control over the Isthmus of 
Suez; each suffered defeat. But the combined forces of Britain and 
France met with disaster after one short week in their effort to 
regain control of the Suez Canal from Nasser and his third rate 
army.163
 
The events of Suez did not result in the immediate end of the British Empire, but  
weakened British world standing and allowed the beginning of the process of 
decolonization.  No longer would Britain dictate politics in the Middle East and no longer 
would the British control the canal. The eighty one year attachment had ended. 
The Suez Crisis and the Sevres Protocol represented the last peak in the imperial 
attachment to the canal. In the prior two phases, the power of the British Empire allowed 
for direct action to safeguard the canal. However as British power waned, the attachment 
to the canal remained unaltered.  Eden used the reasons of oil supplies and the Soviet 
threat as legitimizations for the actions during the Suez Crisis, but neither was valid 
enough to necessitate the behavior of the British Government. Pressure from the Suez 
Group, the public, and the British past mandated that the canal remain British or belong 
to no other country. The canal held a hallowed place in the imperial worldview and to 
forfeit possession of the canal to a former holding was analogous to forfeiting any British 
claim to world power. Eden and many in his party saw the canal as the last possession of 
influence Britain controlled in the changing world political scene. Such was the deep 
rooted attachment to the canal that Eden risked the vitality of empire, the British 
economy, and his own career to maintain British control, or at least influence, over the 
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canal. Like Disraeli, Gladstone, and Churchill before him, Eden wanted to maintain the 
imperial attachment to the canal and avoid the shame of being the Prime Minister who 
lost this vital artery. Eden alienated Britain’s American and Arab allies and sounded the 
beginning of the end of the British Empire. Eden risked his political career and the 
empire on reclaiming the canal, unfortunately Eden lost. The importance attached to the 
canal sounded the end of the empire. In the past, Britain had fought to protect the canal 
and been successful in defending the canal. The canal was the lifeline of the empire, or so 
it was thought. The attachment to the canal was so great and entrenched that Eden knew 
he had to act and believed his actions were justified, even the collusion. Unfortunately, 

















 Successive British Governments from Disraeli to Eden viewed the Suez Canal as 
a vital part of the British Empire.  The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the Great 
Revolt had demonstrated the need for the empire to control or at least dominate the 
Middle East to protect the empire.  The Suez Canal represented not only a great benefit to 
British trade but a vital cog in imperial security.  Control of the canal meant control of the 
Middle East, the safety of the Indian Empire, and later the protection of oil supplies to the 
empire.  Britain depended on the region to maintain the vital artery between the Home 
Islands and India.  The canal was the scene of great British victories and the gateway to 
the exotic lands of the empire.  Disraeli felt he achieved a great coup by the purchase of 
the canal shares in 1875 and, despite doubters at the time, he was correct.  The imperial 
attachment to the canal endured several shifts from 1875 to 1956, but one constant 
remained: the empire needed the canal. 
 Beginning in 1875, the canal occupied a central role in the strategy of the British 
Empire. The danger of a French controlled canal astride the route to India was too grave a 
danger for imperial strategists to allow.  The British established themselves as the prime 
beneficiary of the canal in the early 1870s and gained a say in the running of the Suez 
Canal Company.  Despite an initial fear of entanglement in Egypt, the British used the 
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canal for economic benefit in the early 1870s.  Khedive Ismail’s attempts at 
Westernization and the negative effects of these projects on Egypt’s finance, plus worries 
of European financial ties with Egypt forced the British to take a direct role in the 
government of Egypt through the 1877 Dual Control.  The subsequent Arabi Revolt in 
1882 and British occupation served to demonstrate the importance the British attached to 
the canal.  The threat of anarchy and lawlessness in the canal area prompted the 
Gladstone Government to take action.  While explained as an invasion to restore order, 
Gladstone admitted to Lord Ripon that “apart from the canal we have no interest in 
Egypt.”1 A temporary occupation began and lasted until 1956.  The first phase of the 
imperial attachment to the canal saw the British position along the canal threatened by 
several European powers and identified as the achilles’ heel of the empire.  Nonetheless, 
controlling the canal or preventing others from controlling the canal became a bulwark of 
British imperial defense policy. 
 The period from 1914 to 1945 was characterized by British vacillation over the 
importance of the canal.  The British garrisoned and defended the canal in World War I. 
The canal was the scene and starting point of the only purely British victories of World 
War I and it was intimately associated with the actions of Allenby and Lawrence of 
Arabia. The British territorial acquisitions after World War I created a new area of 
imperial rule with the canal as the centerpiece.  Such was the British attachment to the 
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canal that the British Government insisted that British dominance over the canal be 
written into the peace treaties after World War I.  The importance of the canal grew with 
the pending independence of Egypt and the British Government refused to hand over the 
canal to the Egyptians, citing the issue of the canal as one of the four points of reservation 
for Egyptian independence.  The interwar period saw a temporary retreat from the 
traditional view of the canal.  The base at Singapore and the prospect of war with Japan 
rendered the canal expendable and allowed Egyptian defense to become dilapidated.  
Only when Italy threatened the British dominance of the canal was the Mediterranean 
once again termed the first battlefield of Britain.  The canal occupied a central role in the 
North African Campaign with the Axis forces attempting to seize the canal and British 
forces preventing the loss of the canal.  The victories of Montgomery and the Eighth 
Army were tied to the canal.  Without the canal, no British troops would have been in the 
region.  In both World Wars, the canal was used to transport imperial troops to defend the 
empire and was the scene of the forces of the empire rallying to defeat the enemies of the 
crown. 
 The last phase of imperial attachment stretched from 1945 to 1956.  Similar to the 
second phase, the canal went through a period of de-emphasis.  The Atlee Government 
wanted to hand over the canal and believed that there was little use for the British base at 
the Canal Zone.  The development of nuclear weapons and the weakness of Britain in 
comparison with the Soviets and Americans necessitated the empire cutting its losses.  
The failure of the Sidqi-Bevin talks and the loss of Palestine, though, re-emphasized the 
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importance of the canal.  The British Empire might have lost India, but new importance 
was found for the canal.  The canal was the most important strategic holding in the 
Middle East, the one part of the globe where Britain was paramount.  It also represented a 
base from which the British could meet Soviet advances and play an active role in the 
Cold War.  Finally, the oil shipped through the canal represented the existence and 
survival of Western Europe.  The Suez Crisis of 1956 demonstrated the lingering 
attachment to the canal and the continued British reluctance to accept anything other than 
British control of the canal.  When Nasser nationalized the canal, the British Government 
began planning an invasion despite its weakened power. The Eden Government even 
went as far as to engage in collusion to protect the canal. The end of the Suez Crisis and 
the blocking of the canal formed the last gasps of the imperial attachment, after which the 
British ceased to play a role in canal operations and, to a huge extent, ceased to be a 
world power. 
 This thesis proposed to show the continued imperial attachment to the canal. 
Some historians view the history of British-Suez Canal policy as a scattering of events 
dictated by larger world events. This view is simply not the case. The British Government 
and British Foreign Policy linked themselves to the security of the Suez Canal. In the first 
phase of attachment, the canal was viewed as necessary to protect the Indian Empire and 
guarantee British trade, both sources of British world power.  British power became 
linked to the canal from 1875 to 1914 and the canal guaranteed imperial trade and 
security.  The second phase from, 1914 to 1945 showcased the importance and continued 
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presence of the canal in British Imperial Strategy and policy.  Both World Wars saw the 
British devote thousands of troops to the protection of the canal.  The British risked their 
world status and even the empire on one last attempt to protect the canal in the third 
phase of its history.  Essentially, the imperial attachment to the canal proved to be more 
than a series of isolated events.  Instead, the imperial attachment to the canal began with 
the opening of the canal and the realization of the strategic and economic importance of 
the canal for the vitality of the empire.  When the initial reason of Indian security ended 
in 1947, the British Government found new reasons of oil and influence.  The canal 
formed a source of strength and power for the empire and it is not coincidental that the 
end of the imperial attachment came at the same time as the wane of the empire.  The 
multitude of shifts relating to the canal represented the changing role of Britain in the 
world.  While the canal did not hold the empire together by itself, it certainly aided in the 
success of the empire.  No matter what importance the canal held at a certain time, one 
statement proved accurate: the canal occupied a vital role in imperial strategy and policy 
from 1875 to 1956 and that strategy intertwined itself with the maintenance of the power 
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